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Does the Mandatory Bid Rule Discourage Acquisitions above the Threshold?

원문정보

Yongjoon Lee, Bushik Kim, Woochan Kim

한국재무학회 재무연구 제39권 제1호 2026.02 pp.125-170
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초록

영어

Our study challenges the belief that the mandatory bid rule (MBR) raises acquisition costs and deters takeovers. Leveraging the staggered adoptions of the mandatory bid rule (MBR) globally, we find that the MBR reduces the control premium, a key component of acquisition costs. Moreover, evidence does not support the claim that MBR discourages acquisitions above the threshold. While post-MBR ownership levels from block trades decline slightly, the likelihood of crossing the threshold remains unchanged. In the U.K., private deals above the threshold are fewer than below, but this gap is even larger in the U.S., which does not have an MBR.

목차

Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Literature Review and Hypotheses
1. Existing Literature
2. Hypotheses Development
Ⅲ. Data and Research Design
1. Sample Construction
2. Variable Definitions
3. Summary Statistics
4. Research Design
Ⅳ. Results
1. MBR and Control Premium
2. MBR and Private Benefits of Control
3. MBR and Post-Block Trade Ownership Manipulation
4. MBR and Post-Block Trade Ownership Sizes
5. MBR and Deal Frequency
Ⅴ. Robustness Check
1. Alternative Measures of Control Premium
2. Time-varying Country-level Factors
Ⅵ. Conclusion
References

저자정보

  • Yongjoon Lee Stephen M. Ross School of Business, University of Michigan
  • Bushik Kim Korea University Business School
  • Woochan Kim Korea University Business School

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