원문정보
Disgorgement of Profits and Unjust Enrichment in Trust Law - Reconfiguring Director’s Duty of Loyalty‘s Remedies -
초록
영어
Article 43(1) of the Korean Trust Act, enacted in 2012, states: "Where a trustee has violated his duties incurring any loss to the trust property, the settlor, beneficiary, or other trustees where a number of trustees exist, may request the relevant trustee to restore, reinstate the trust property: Provided, that where it is impossible or substantially impracticable to reinstate the trust property, or excessive expenses are incurred in such reinstatement, or where any special ground exists making reinstatement inappropriate, a claim for damages may be raised." Furthermore, article 43(3) of the Korean Trust Act states that "where a trustee is in breach of a duty of loyalty stipulated in Articles 33 through 37, he should disgorge all the profits acquired by himself or a third party to the trust property, even if no loss has incurred to the trust property." The disgorgement remedy set out in Article 43(3) provides exceptional relief, preventing the trustee from realizing any gains resulting from a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duty. Yet, this powerful gain-based remedy has not been applied by courts in South Korea. Thus, it is difficult to understand a clear rule for determining disgorgement of profits case. Before the enactment of article 43(3), there have been debates by legal scholars whether any legal basis already existed for disgorgement of profits in South Korea. "Unjust enrichment" and "management of another's affairs(negotiorum gestio)" were traditional remedies available to an injured party, however the legal basis for disgorgement of profits was tenuous. Thus, the legislature found it necessary to specially enact Article 43(3) to be able to impose this remedy. However, no case law has been developed so far and Article 43(3) is often overlooked due to its obscurity. First, this paper will briefly examine the restitution by subtraction and restitution for wrongs. Then, this paper take closer look at one of the latter, the basic principles of disgorgement of profits in a breach of trustee's fiduciary duty in Anglo-American jurisprudence. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, the purpose of disgorgement of profits is to strip profits if they are gained in a breach of fiduciary duty owed by the trustee to its beneficiaries. The fiduciary duty of the trustee requires the fiduciary to exercise the highest duty of trust and confidence between the fiduciary and its beneficiaries. The fiduciary must exercise its powers and discretion carefully given the vulnerable and dependent nature of any beneficiary's relationship to its trustee. Given the special status of this relationship, a trustee owes the highest fiduciary duty to the beneficiary, which includes the 'no-conflict rule' and the 'no-profit rule'. The vitally important duty of loyalty is not self-enforcing, and when a breach occurs, the remedy should be in conformity with the duty. The rationale for disgorgement of profits is to deter a breach of the duty of loyalty. Deterrence and prophylaxis are the strongest rational for disgorgement of profits. The quantification of illegally gained profits must reflect the nuances of the fiduciary relationship and the manner in which the duty was breached; the uneasy interplay between causation, remoteness and allowances must be considered. In ordering a disgorgement of profits, a court should factor in the fiduciary's skill and effort in determining the amount of the profits that should be disgorged. Disgorgement of profits is a harsh remedy, and its effectiveness as a deterrent depends on its proportionality to the wrongs. Finally, this paper examines whether it is plausible to apply the disgorgement of profits remedy to a corporation's board of directors. In Anglo-American jurisprudence, a director of a corporation is categorically treated as a status-based fiduciary who owes a fiduciary duty to the corporation. If unauthorized profits are made by a director in breach of his fiduciary duty to the corporation, the director should be required to disgorge the profits just as a disloyal trustee is required to disgorge profits under the Trust Act in South Korea. Under the Korean Commercial Code, remedies exist that are functionally similar to the disgorgement of profits, yet these remedies are fragmented. For instance, directors are prohibited from engaging in a transaction which competes with their corporation's interests without the consent of the board of directors. If a director violates his duty not to compete in the absence of the board's consent, the director may be held liable for monetary damages sustained by the corporation. Additionally, intervention rights are granted to a corporation under the Korean Commercial Code. The corporation may intervene and substitute itself for the director in the third-party transaction. Furthermore, a director may not usurp certain business opportunities available to the corporation without approval by the board of directors. If a director usurps the corporation's business opportunity in contravention of his fiduciary duty, then the director may be held liable for damages based upon a presumption that the ill-gotten gains made by the director are the damages suffered by the corporation. Both intervention rights and the presumption that illegal profits are the corporation's damages are modified forms of the remedy of disgorgement of profits. However, a breach of a general duty of loyalty under the Korean Commercial Code does not stipulate these gain-based remedies. The directors of a corporation are in charge of managing the company's business and thus, their role is similar to that of a trustee. Thus, this paper argues that the remedy of disgorgement of profits should be adopted for breach of a duty of loyalty by a director under the Korean Commercial Code.
한국어
구 신탁법에서는 수탁자가 의무를 위반하여 신탁재산에 손해가 발생한 경우에 손해배상책임과 원상회복책임만 을 인정하였고 수탁자나 제3자가 의무 위반으로 이익을 취득하더라도 신탁재산에 손해가 발생하지 않은 경우에 는 수탁자의 책임을 인정하기 어려웠다. 따라서 2012년 개정 신탁법은 수탁자의 충실의무에 대한 일반적인 조항 을 신설하고 제43조의 제1항 및 제2항의 원상회복책임과 손해배상책임을 보완하는 동시에, 충실의무를 위반하여 수탁자나 제3자가 이득을 취득한 경우 수탁자가 이득 전부를 반환하는 규정(이하 “이득토출책임”)을 신설하였다. 신탁법 제43조 제3항의 이득토출책임 규정은 민법이 손해배상을 기본적인 구제수단으로 하고, 부당이득의 반환 범위 역시 손실을 한도로 하는 것을 고려할 때에 극히 예외적인 구제수단이다. 따라서 본 논문은 신탁법 제43조 의 기초가 된 영국의 부당이득법리와 원상회복책임를 개관하고, 영국의 위법행위의 원상회복(Restitution for Wrongs) 중 수탁자에게 적용한 이득토출책임 법리를 파악하기 위하여 신인관계, 신인의무를 함께 검토하였다. 지위에 기인한 신인관계는 수탁자를 전형으로 하지만, 회사의 이사, 대리인 등을 포함한다. 이사의 구체적인 충실 의무 위반에 파편적으로 인정하는 개입권(경업금지)과 이익의 손해추정 조문(회사의 기회유용금지)은 수탁자의 이득토출책임과 마찬가지로 이익충돌 억지를 근거로 한다. 따라서 신탁법상 수탁자의 원상회복책임 및 이득토출 책임을 이사에게도 도입할 것을 적극적으로 검토할 필요가 있다
목차
Ⅰ. 들어가며
Ⅱ. 영국의 원상회복책임과 이득토출책임
1. 원상회복책임과 부당이득법리
2. 이득토출책임과 신인의무 법리
Ⅲ. 신탁법상 원상회복책임과 이득토출책임
1. 원상회복책임과 손해배상책임
2. 이득토출책임
3. 다른 법리와의 구분
Ⅳ. 상법으로의 확장가능성
1. 이사의 충실의무와 구제수단
2. 이득토출책임 도입 제안
Ⅴ. 마치며
<참고문헌>
Abstract
