earticle

영어

This study empirically investigates the impact of CEO power on auditing costs and abnormal audit fees among publicly listed companies in China's A-share market from 2009 to 2019. A total of 28,780 firm-year observations listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges were used for this analysis. CEO power was operationalized as a dummy variable, incorporating factors such as concurrent managerial roles, stock dispersion, and managerial tenure. Abnormal audit fee was calculated by subtracting the expected audit costs from the actual auditing fees. Three hypotheses were posited for the study. Hypothesis 1 posits that CEO power would significantly impact abnormal audit fees. Hypothesis 2 suggests that this impact would vary depending on the corporate governance structure (state-owned vs. non-state-owned). Additionally, Hypothesis 3 asserts that the size of the accounting firm will act as a moderating variable. The primary empirical findings are outlined as follows: First, CEO power was found to exert a statistically highly significant positive impact on the dependent variable of abnormal audit fees. Consequently, Hypothesis 1 was accepted. The findings can be interpreted from the perspective of agency theory as indicating that the greater CEO power, the more they, as agents, incur bonding costs(a type of agency cost) to assure their principals of their actions, which in turn leads to an increase in auditing costs and abnormal audit fees. Second, the average total audit costs for state-owned enterprises(SOE) were higher than those for non-SOE. T-tests for the homogeneity of means between the two groups revealed statistically significant differences. While the abnormal audit fees for non-SOE were positive on average, those for SOE were negative. Notably, in both SOE and non-SOE, the effect of CEO power on abnormal audit fees was statistically significant. Third, the average total auditing fees for BIG4 accounting audit firms were statistically significantly higher than those for non-BIG4 firms. However, no statistically significant difference was observed in the abnormal audit fees between the two groups. This implies that the overall auditing costs do not deviate significantly from the expected audit costs, regardless of the size of the accounting firm. The effect of CEO power on abnormal audit fees was statistically highly significant in both BIG4 and non-BIG4 firms. Fisher’s permutation test revealed that there was a statistically significant difference between the two groups with respect to the POWER estimator. Compared to non-BIG4 firms, the CEO power in BIG4 firms was found to be higher on abnormal audit fees. The implications and limitations of this study are outlined below. Given the escalating prominence of Chinese enterprises in the global economy, an investigation into China’s auditing market emerges as a particularly pertinent subject. Such an inquiry promises to be instrumental in dissecting and comprehending managerial behaviors. Additionally, this study contributes to the body of knowledge by delineating an auditing function from the vantage point of agency theory, capable of substantiating the actions of individuals, thereby providing a scaffold for subsequent scholarly endeavors. Conversely, the present research has not accounted for temporal and sectoral variables within its analytical framework. The ramifications of the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular, are presumed to have exerted a profound impact on corporate governance. There is a prospect for future research to extend its scope by incorporating the pandemic’s repercussions and industry-specific attributes. Beyond the measures adopted in this study, it is hoped that future research will employ diverse techniques to investigate further the effect of managerial influence on audit costs or abnormal audit fees.

한국어

경영자 영향력은 경영자의 전략적 선택에서 핵심적인 역할을 수행한다. 본 연구 에서는 경영자 영향력이 감사비용과 비정상감사보수에 미치는 영향을 실증 분석 하였다. 더불어 중국기업 지배구조(국유/비국유기업)와 회계법인규모(BIG4/ non-BIG4)가 조절요인으로 작용하는지를 실증 분석하였다. 2009년부터 2019 년까지 중국 A주의 상장기업 28,780개 기업-연도 표본을 대상으로 연구하였다. 비정상감사보수는 실제감사비용에서 기대감사비용을 차감한 값이다. 실증분석 결과, 경영자 영향력은 종속변수인 비정상감사보수에 통계적으로 매우 유의하게 양(+)의 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 대리이론의 관점에서 경영자 영향력이 클수록 경영자는 대리인으로서의 자신의 행동을 위임자들에게 보증하기 위해 보 증비용(bonding cost)을 지불하기 때문에 감사비용과 비정상감사보수가 증가한 것으로 해석할 수 있다. 경영자 영향력이 비정상감사보수에 미치는 영향은 중국기 업 지배구조나 회계감사법인 규모에 관계없이 매우 지대하게 유의하였다. 국유기 업의 총감사비용 평균은 비국유기업의 경우보다 더 높았으며, 비국유기업의 비정 상감사보수 평균은 양(+)인 반면에, 국유기업의 비정상감사보수 평균은 음(-)으 로 나타났으며, 두 집단의 평균은 통계적으로 유의하게 차이가 났다. BIG4기업은 non-BIG4기업에 비해 경영자 영향력은 비정상감사보수에 더 높게 나타났다.