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초록
영어
Using novel indirect employment data and a Supreme Court ruling against subcontracted employment, I show that the contingent employment of skilled labor reduces innovation. Following the ruling, establishments with a higher reliance on subcontracted workers innovate more compared to those with a lesser reliance. This nding is conditional on compensation schemes rewarding employees for their investment in rm-specic skills and long-term performance, stems from collaborations with existing inventor employees, and does not coincide with increases in operating leverage, R&D, or capital intensity.
목차
Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Institutional details
2.1 Contingent employment
2.2 In-house subcontracted workers
3 Research Design
3.1 Supreme Court ruling against IS employment
3.2 Ruling as a shock on innovation incentive of IS workers
3.3 Establishment-level estimation
3.4 Firm-level estimation
4 Data
4.1 Establishment data
4.2 Firm data
4.3 Propensity score matching
4.4 Manufacturing employment
5 Results
5.1 Covariate balance
5.2 Employment
5.3 Innovation
5.4 Channel I: innovation incentive
5.5 Channel II: managerial responses
5.6 Innovation by new hires
5.7 Innovation by new versus existing inventor employees
5.8 Innovation and employee mobility
5.9 Innovation and employee entrepreneurship
6 Discussions and robustness checks
6.1 Unionization
6.2 Managerial myopia
6.3 Post-ruling changes in employee compensation
6.4 Post-ruling changes in incentive schemes
6.5 Post-ruling changes in competition
6.6 Process versus non-process innovations
6.7 Patent characteristics and inventor identity
6.8 Robustness to alternative speci•cation choices
7 Conclusion
References
Figure
Table
INTERNET APPENDIX
1 Introduction
2 Institutional details
2.1 Contingent employment
2.2 In-house subcontracted workers
3 Research Design
3.1 Supreme Court ruling against IS employment
3.2 Ruling as a shock on innovation incentive of IS workers
3.3 Establishment-level estimation
3.4 Firm-level estimation
4 Data
4.1 Establishment data
4.2 Firm data
4.3 Propensity score matching
4.4 Manufacturing employment
5 Results
5.1 Covariate balance
5.2 Employment
5.3 Innovation
5.4 Channel I: innovation incentive
5.5 Channel II: managerial responses
5.6 Innovation by new hires
5.7 Innovation by new versus existing inventor employees
5.8 Innovation and employee mobility
5.9 Innovation and employee entrepreneurship
6 Discussions and robustness checks
6.1 Unionization
6.2 Managerial myopia
6.3 Post-ruling changes in employee compensation
6.4 Post-ruling changes in incentive schemes
6.5 Post-ruling changes in competition
6.6 Process versus non-process innovations
6.7 Patent characteristics and inventor identity
6.8 Robustness to alternative speci•cation choices
7 Conclusion
References
Figure
Table
INTERNET APPENDIX
저자정보
참고문헌
자료제공 : 네이버학술정보