원문정보
초록
영어
This study examines the effect of a firm’s ownership structure on its corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using firms that belong to Korean business groups, chaebols, as a sample and their ES ratings to measure CSR, we find a positive relationship between control-ownership disparity (i.e., a divergence between voting and cash-flow rights of controlling shareholders) and ES performance, especially social performance. Additionally, we show that when control-ownership disparities increase due to mergers between other affiliated firms, ES ratings rise significantly. Moreover, we find that firms controlled by descendants are more likely to exhibit higher levels of CSR compared to firms controlled by founders. Our results support the agency view of CSR, which suggests that CSR investment is associated with controlling shareholders’ incentives to pursue their own private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders.
목차
1. Introduction
2. Hypothesis development
3. Data and measurement
3.1 Sample
3.2 Control-ownership disparity measurement
3.3 Other variables
3.4 Summary statistics
4. Empirical results
4.1 Control-ownership disparity
4.2 Voting rights and cash-flow rights
4.3 Mergers between affiliated firms
4.4 Pyramid layer and position
4.5 Family generations
4.6 ES Score and control-ownership disparity in recent trends
5. Conclusion
References
Figure
Table
Appendix