earticle

영어

This article explores the evolution of Soviet foreign policy in Asia from the late 1960s to the early 1990s. It argues that, unable to contribute much economically, Moscow had had to rely on its military posture to project power in the region. In the 1960s-70s, the main Soviet preoccupation in Asia was the containment of China. To this end, the Soviet leaders pursued regional alliances with India and Vietnam while seeking to engage the United States and Japan in a broad anti-Chinese front. These efforts had mixed results. While the Soviets made impressive gains with India and Vietnam, Soviet-Japanese relations stalled over Moscow’s unwillingness to compromise on the territorial issue, while the US capitalized on the Soviet fears of China in order to play the two Communist countries against one another. Soviet policy began to change in the early 1980s when, in view of the Soviet Union’s growing international isolation, Moscow attempted to re-engage with China. The painstaking process of the Sino-Soviet rapprochement led to full normalization by 1989, opening the stage to a closer relationship between the two countries, which continues to the present day. Meanwhile, Mikhail Gorbachev positively responded to South Korea’s normalization probes. Even Soviet-Japanese relations, though still stalled over territorial problem, experienced a degree of revival. However, Gorbachev’s tendency to de-emphasize military power led to the decline of Moscow’s regional influence, which continued through the 1990s. Renewed investment in power projection under Vladimir Putin has brought Russia back to the table in Asia as a generally unloved but respected Asian player.