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Dynamic Adverse Selection and Belief Update in Credit

초록

영어

We develop a dynamic model of debt contracts with adverse selection and belief updates. In the model, entrepreneurs borrow investment goods from lenders to run businesses whose returns depend on entrepreneurial productivity and common productivity. The entrepreneurial productivity is the entrepreneur’s private information, and the lender constructs beliefs about the entrepreneur’s productivity based on the entrepreneur’s business operation history, common productivity history, and terms of the contract. The model provides insights on the dynamic and cross-sectional relation between firm age and credit risk, cyclical asymmetry of the business cycle, slow recovery after a crisis, and the constructive economic downturn.

목차

Abstract
1 Introduction
2 Model
3 Bargaining game
4 Equilibrium
5 Applications
5.1 Entrepreneur age and credit risk
5.2 Common productivity and aggregate production
6 Conclusion
References
Appendix

저자정보

  • Inkee Jang Xiamen University
  • Kee-Youn Kang Yonsei University

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