earticle

영어

The purpose of this study is to analyze the impact of sanctions on capital costs on companies designated as unfaithful disclosure corporations. An unfaithful disclosure corporation targeted in this study can be judged as a company that has failed to faithfully fulfill its disclosure obligations under the disclosure regulations of the KOSPI market and the KOSDAQ market, and is suspected of disclosure and financial transparency. In addition, if designated as an unfaithful disclosure company, penalty points will be applied at the deliberation of the exchange, and the penalty points imposed are accumulated over a period of time. The high number of cumulative penalty points means that the penalty points imposed during the period in which the penalty points are accumulated are large or repeatedly unfaithful disclosures have been made. In other words, it can be inferred that higher cumulative penalty points could lead to a greater reduction in transparency in disclosure. As a result of the analysis, the dependent variable's weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and the FD(coefficient indicating whether or not the unfaithful disclosure company was designated) was 0.651 (t=5.18), showing a statistically significant positive (+) value at the 1% significance level. We found that as a result of supporting hypothesis 1, the weighted average cost of capital for a company designated as an unfaithful disclosure company is higher than those of a non-designated company. Additionally we test the control variables. The signs of control variables were also found to be consistent with the results of most previous studies. The coefficients of return on assets (ROA), weight ratio of tangible assets (PPE), and dummy variable of Big 4 auditors (BIG4) showed , negative results, statistically significant at the 1% significance level. It can be shown that the higher the total return on assets, the higher the proportion of tangible assets, and when Big 4 auditors perform assurance services, the risk of default is likely to be reduced and the collateral power is likely to be increased, resulting in the lower weighted average cost of capital. Therefore, from 2008 to 2019, the weighted average capital cost (WACC) was used to analyze how designation of an unfaithful disclosure corporation and cumulative penalty points affect capital costs. The empirical analysis showed that the weighted average capital cost of a company designated as an unfaithful disclosure corporation showed a significant amount of value compared to that of an unassigned company. That means that the capital cost of a company designated as an unfaithful disclosure corporation was relatively higher than that of a non-designated company. In addition, the greater the cumulative penalty points of an entity designated as an unfaithful disclosure, the greater the degree of increase in capital costs. These results suggest that the regulatory effect of unfaithful disclosure exists. This study has a contribution in that it is the first paper to analyze the effect of unfaithful disclosure and cumulative penalty points on total capital costs. In addition, it is meaningful to verify the effectiveness of the unfaithful disclosure system, and the results of this study may help to evaluate the regulatory effect of unfaithful disclosure.