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This paper is a critical attempt to let race be seen in cognitive literary and cultural studies. The strategy of making race visible in cognitive sciences is definitely a double-edged sword. However, insofar as the location of race is found not to be null and void but to be significant and supplementary, it is worth exploring some ways in which the cognitive approach may enter into a productive dialogue with identity politics. For the purpose of laying the groundwork for a cognitive reexamination of race issues, I come up with three relevant questions: first, what is cognition?; second, why race matters in the cognitive process?; thirdly, what is at issue in cognitive criticism? In my answer to the first question, I suggest that race should be considered as a variable in the cognitive process which is characterized as unconscious and pre-/unreflective. In order to answer the sensitive second question, drawing on such concepts as levels of intentionality and Theory of Mind, I analyze how higher intentionality often results in too much of a cognitive load in US race relations. Particularly in terms of race and public space in American society, I try to find a common cognitive problem in three black men’s terrible cases: Homer Plessy in Plessy v. Ferguson, Bigger Thomas of Native Son, and George Floyd against the backdrop of the Black Lives Matter movement. Regarding the third comprehensive inquiry, I look into the bias and limitations of the scholars who have preoccupied the territory of cognitive criticism. I also deal with the political issue of cognitive universals. Finally, looking upon the strange bedfellows of cognition and race as a (com)promising couple, I map out possible scenarios and model plans for creating a feel-so-good morning of criticism.