earticle

영어

Philosophical zombies are defined as those who are functionally, biologically, medically and physically equal to human being and yet have no phenomenal (qualitative) consciousness. The wellknown zombie argument shows that physicalism or materialism on the consciousness is inappropriate. Extending or reversing the zombie argument, however, one can attack dualism with the same logic by which physicalism was refuted. This shows that the a priori argument related to the philosophy of mind is rather void in contents and hence the traditional Cartesian frame of the mind-body problem is problematic and needs correction. I propose an alternative framework which can be called the “phenomenological thoughts” from the discussion of science as well as philosophical tradition. According to the phenomenological thoughts, it is not true that the world exist a priori before it is perceived by the subject. Neither is true that the world is a product of the ideal imagination which the subject makes. The phenomenological thoughts emphasizes on the encounter between world and the subject. The traditional mind-body problem is extended to the mind-body-body problem, in which the relation between the Körper (the corporeal body as the physical object) and the Leib (the lived body with sentience) sheds a new insight on the understanding of consciousness. In this paper I examined four phenomenological thoughts: the Autopoiesis theory, the Enactive approach, the Umwelt theory, and the Onsaengmyeong (or Global Life) theory. In their autopoiesis theory Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela proposed that cognition (and thus consciousness) is the consequence of the structural interaction or coupling between the autopoietic system (viz. life) and the environment. The enactive approach in cognitive science, in contrast to the traditional computationism and connectionism, is based on the embodied mind theory as discussed by Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch. Estonian zoologist Jakob von Uexküll developed the Umwelt theory as the covering research program in theoretical biology. The Umwelt theory, originally discussed in theoretical biology, gives a great resonance not only to the enactive approach but also to the Onsaengmyeong theory proposed by Hwe Ik Zhang. I suggest that the concept of co-life in the Onsaengmyeong theory is best understood from the Umwelt theory and it is the key by which the Umwelt theory and enactive approach can be linked. These four phenomenological thoughts instantiate the alternative

한국어

의식에 대한 철학적 논의와 현대 신경과학의 접점에서 좀비 논변과 확장된 좀비 논변을 검토했다. 철학적 좀비는 우리와 기능적으로, 생물학적으로, 의학적으로, 물리적으로 완전히 동일하지만 현상적(지각적) 의식은 없는 존재로 정의된다. 좀비 논변 자체는 의식에 대한 환원주의적 물리주의가 지니는 한계를 드러내는 데 초점을 맞추고 있지만, 좀비 논변을 확장하면 같은 형식의 논변을 이용하여 오히려 이원론을 공격할 수 있음을 보이고, 이를 통해 몸-마음 문제라는 데카르트적 틀이 부적합함을 논했다. 현상학적 사유의 전통을 적극적으로 수용하여 문제의 틀을 몸-신체-마음으로 확장함으로써, 의식에 관해 훨씬 더 풍부한 철학적 논의가 가능해짐을 보였다. 이러한 현상학적 사유들로서 움베르토 마투라나와 프란시스코 바렐라의 자체생성성 이론, 에반 톰슨 등의 인지과학에 대한 기연적(起緣的) 접근, 야콥 폰 윅스퀼의 둘레세계 이론, 장회익의 온생명론을 검토하고, 이들이 긴밀하게 만날 수 있는 계기와 연결고리를 시론적으로 모색했다.