earticle

영어

In the financial industry, many transactions are doneperformed covertly to secure an information advantage over competitors in the market. Trading also demands expertise in risk management and the valuation of the assets under consideration to determine which trades will create value for investors. BecauseAs information asymmetries contribute to profitability, iesthey are intentionally sought by asset managers, meaning that purposefully created information asymmetries are unavoidable and likely to persist within the financial market. It is tthatTherefore, the government must regulate the financial industry more stringently than other industries, such as technology-based manufacturing industries. Moreover, the intensity of separation between banks and other businesses is impacted by the extent of implicit information asymmetries, because the soundness of the finance industry can be severely injured by the very existence of information asymmetries. Being able to distinguish between the positive effects of information asymmetries, which should be encouraged, and the negative impacts of information asymmetries, which should be prohibited, is more important than ever before. This paper investigates this distinction through the regulations set up by of the government. The regulation of the finance industry goes back to the era of laissez-faire capitalism, when the 1907 financial panic resulted in the establishment of the U.S. central bank, the Federal Reserve System. In the aftermath of the Great Depression, financial regulation cul-minated in the Banking Act of 1933, also known as the Glass Steagall Act, which separated Wall Street (banking) from Mmain Sstreet (commerce). Fewer than ten years after the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act by the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Great Recession broke out in 2008. As the economy recovers, although with a lower growth rate, and with the development and deployment of information technology such as artificial intelligence, there is again pressure to deregulate but in a different context. The emergence of Iinternet only banks poses a quite different but daunting challenge to the conventional notion of the separation of banking and commerce. Internet only banks foster competition within the banking industry, which has become more oligopolistic in the aftermath of the Great Recession. As these entrants require huge investments in the technical infrastructure to operate properly through the Internet while offering banking services, the traditional regulation of share-holding limits, which has worked effectively since 1933, faces an apparent obstacle. To promote the resilience and reinvigoration of the banking industry, the Korean government lifted its share-holding limit regulation and opened a path for funds from the information and communications technology (ICT) industry sto participate in the share ownership in the banking sector in 2015. This was, a step in the right direction. However, non-ICT investors are still banned from the banking industry. In the meantime, non-ICT industry capital can still participate in the Iinternet banking sector indirectly, either through ownership build-up in an ICT firm or by mimicking an ICT firm under the guise of the ICT industry, circumventing the ban effectively. The new investors in the Internet banking industry demand a further relaxation in share ownership, leading to a call for scrutiny of whether further deregulation promotes competition in the banking industry and enhances the soundness of the financial industry. Desirable self-selection is an important goal, and good quality Internet bank applicants should be allowed to acquire Internet banking licenses while bad quality applicants should not. There is considerable concern as to whether the government’s current revision of the rule banning non-ICT investors from controlling Internet banks could lead to a sustainable separating equilibrium. This paper addresses this point and focuses on the adverse selection problem due to information asymmetries over the quality of prospective participants in the banking industry. The current combination of rules such as the share-holding limit and the loan concentration ratio could open the path to a desirable situation. As the lifting of the share-holding limit is accompanied by credit exposure control (particularly for the loan concentration ratio), it is possible that the ban benefits both Iinternet only banking participants and the government in light of the expected outlay in the case of a bailout due to non-performing loans. The paper demonstrates with a simple theoretical setup that a welfare enhancing outcome is within reach despite the separation lapse after we control the loan concentration ratio while allowing for greater ownership of Iinternet only banks by the ICT industry. This resultfinding will beis of great use to policy makers as they consider the implementation of new rules.

한국어

정보 비대칭은 금융거래에 수반되는 정보 분석 능력 차이로 발생하지만 거래의 은밀성으로 발생한다. 그래서 금융업은 엄정한 규제하에 있고, 미국은 은산 분리를 1933년 이래 유지해왔다. 한국은 2015년 인터넷 전문 은행을 허용하면서 신규 인터넷 전문 은행들의 경영권 안정과 기술적 기반 하부구조 구축용 대규모 투자금 조달 용이성 확보를 위해서 ICT산업자본의 은행 소유지분 규제를 완화하였다. 비금융 산업자본의 은행 소유지분 확대는 인터넷 전문 은행이 해당 산업자본의 이해관계를 반영한 금융 거래를 하여 사금고로 될 가능성을 높인다. 은행의 사금고화에 따른 경제적 폐해는 혜택의 불평등 뿐 아니라, 편중대출의 부실로 인한 구제금융의 발생이다. 현 논문의 목적은 정부의 구제금융 기대비용을 경제적 비용으로 등치하고, 간결한 역선택 이론 모형 하에서 규제 완화에 따른 신규진입자의 선택을 분석하여 정부의 최적 규제완화 정책 방안의 제시이다. 정부의 구제금융 기대비용의 불변을 만족하는 조건하에서 완화된 소유지분과 동일인 대출 한도 규제를 강화하였을 때 편중 대출 혜택이 큰 산업 자본은 불참하는 자기선택(self-selection)을 한다. 산업자본의 특성에 따라서 인터넷 은행 참여 의사 결정에 대한 분리 균형(separating equilibrium)이 유지된다. 사금고화에 대한 우려는 소유지분 완화에 집중되어 있지만, 동일인 신용 공여 한도 규제와 같은 행위규제 강화의 필요성을 현 논문은 밝히고 있다.