earticle

영어

The purpose of this article is to study how the Japanese military police responded to and perceived the March First Independence Movement. For this, examinations were made of the policies that the Joseon military police force(=the Japanese military police force stationed in Korea) implemented immediately after the March First Independence Movement in response to the March First Independence Movement. In the early stages of the March First Independence Movement, the Japanese department of the army ordered the Joseon military police force to implement quick repression and to thoroughly conduct prior scouting to prevent a spread of the movement. However, as the March First Independence Movement intensified, the department of the army acknowledged that ‘firm action’, or in other words, the use of military force would be inevitable. Still, concerned about criticism at home and abroad, they refrained from excessive repression methods and requested that “mild means whenever possible” should be used and that communications to foreign countries should be censored. Following such orders, the commanding officer of the Joseon military police force also gave instructions to military police provost marshals of each province to be cautious of abusive uses of force and to respond cautiously to foreigner󰠏related matters but also didn’t miss the opportunity to repeatedly emphasize that ‘force must be used firmly’. As the March First Independence Movement in Korea largely became repressed and moved to foreign places such as Jiandao, instructions changed to bear in mind that the Korean people should not be dealt with rashly as there were concerns that excessive repression would reignite the embers of the movement in Korea. In addition, examinations were made of the repression aspects of the military police regarding the March First Independence Movement. The military police was considered a symbol for ‘military rule’ as if represented by the ‘gendarme󰠏oriented police system’ during the March First Independence Movement and attacks of the Korean people were focused on military police outstations and police substations. While the anger and hate of the people towards the military police could also be considered reasons for their attacks, many attacks were also made to rescue people who had been arrested and detained. As the number of people in the military police was small, when there were a large number of people rallying, the military police would cooperate with Japanese troops to disperse and arrest the people rallying. Lastly, observations were made of how the military police perceived the conditions of public opinion at the time when the unauthorized nature of the ‘gendarme󰠏oriented police system' was being pointed out due to the March First Independence Movement. At the time, the military police were enraged at the fact that public opinion was pointing towards the gendarme󰠏oriented police system and the violent nature of the military police as major reasons for the March First Independence Movement and denied the associations drawn between the March First Independence Movement and the military police. They believed that the reason for the March First Independence Movement was not because of the gendarme󰠏oriented police system, as pointed out by public opinion, but that the circumstances were simply coincidental. After the fall of Japan, they attributed responsibility to the Japanese government and argued that the military police who enforced control at the front were actually victims as well.

한국어

본고의 목적은 3.1운동에 일본군 헌병이 어떻게 대응하였고 인식하였는지를 규명하는 것이다. 이를 위해 먼저 3.1운동 이후 직후 조선헌병대가 어떠한 방침을 가지고 3.1운동에 대응했는지에 대해 검토하였다. 3.1운동 초기 일본 육군성이 조선헌병대에게 내린 지시는 운동의 확산을 막기 위해 서둘러 진압에 나설 것과 사전 정탐을 철저히 실시할 것을 명하는 것이었다. 하지만 3.1운동이 격화되자 육군성도 ‘단호한 조치’ 즉 무력의 사용이 불가피하다고 인정하게 되었다. 그러면서도 국내외의 비판을 우려해 지나친 진압방법은 삼가고 “가급적 온화한 수단”을 사용할 것, 그리고 국외로의 통신을 검열하라고 요청하였다. 이러한 지시에 따라 조선헌병대 사령관도 각도의 헌병대장에게 훈시를 내려 기본적으로 무력의 남용과 외국인과 관련된 사안에 대해서는 신중하게 대처할 것을 지시하면서도, 때를 놓치지 않고 “단호히 무력을 사용해야 한다”는 점을 거듭 강조하였다. 국내의 3.1운동은 대부분 진압되고 간도 등 국외로 옮겨가자 훈시의 내용은 지나친 탄압이 오히려 한국 국내에서 운동의 불씨를 다시 살리지 않을까 우려하여 한국 민중을 함부로 대하지 않도록 유념하라는 식으로 바뀌게 되었다. 아울러 3.1운동에 대한 헌병의 진압 양상에 대해서도 검토하였다. 헌병은 3.1운동 당시 ‘헌병경찰제도’로 대표되듯 ‘무단통치’의 상징으로 여겨져 헌병 분견소(分遣所) 및 주재소(駐在所)에 대해 한국 민중의 공격이 집중되었다. 헌병에 대한 민중의 분노와 증오도 공격의 이유라고 할 수 있겠지만, 체포되어 구류 중인 사람들을 탈환하는 것이 목적인 경우도 많았다. 인원이 적었던 헌병은 민중의 수가 많을 경우 지역의 일본군 부대와 협력해 민중들을 해산시키고 체포하였다. 마지막으로 3.1운동의 원인으로 ‘헌병경찰제도’의 무단성이 지목되고 있던 당시의 국내외 여론 상황에 대해 헌병 측이 어떻게 인식하고 있었는지에 대해 알아보았다. 헌병 측은 당시 3.1운동이 일어난 주요 원인으로 여론이 헌병경찰제도 및 헌병의 폭력성을 지목하는 것에 분노하며, 3.1운동과 헌병의 관련성을 부정하였다. 3.1운동의 원인은 여론이 지목하는 헌병경찰제도의 문제가 아니라 우연에 불과하다는 것이다. 일본의 패망 후에는 당시의 일본정부에게 책임을 돌리며 제일선에서 단속에 임한 헌병도 사실은 피해자라는 주장을 펼치고 있다.