earticle

영어

Crowdfunding has received a significant amount of attention from the public in the past few years. By lowering the entry barriers, crowdfunding platforms have allowed less-sophisticated investors to participate in an investment market. However, inexperienced crowd investors often lack ability and resources to correctly infer quality of various projects. When making an investment decision, they heavily rely on information provided by the project managers. To alleviate such information asymmetry between project managers and crowd investors, crowdfunding platforms have recently started to introduce a policy requiring project managers to disclose any potential risks involved in the project. This paper seeks to understand the role of risk disclosure policy in crowdfunding platforms and how it may affect the decisions of both project managers and crowd investors. We provide a model of crowdfunding and show how theoretical predictions of project quality and crowd investment differ across a number of disclosure policies. Based on the proposed model, we plan to employ laboratory economics experiments for empirical tests.