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영어

The Buddhist ethical concept of kuśala (C. shan 善), which is usually rendered as “wholesome” or “skillful,” has drawn significant scholarly attention. Although scholars have not reached a consensus on how to approach Buddhist ethical systems, it seems to be commonly acknowledged that the wholesome dharmas in early Buddhism are divided into two types: the wholesome dharmas on the mundane level and the wholesome dharmas on the supramundane level. According to the typical account of Buddhist soteriology, a practitioner should cultivate these two types of wholesome dharmas in order to reach the final goal of nirvāṇa. However, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, in which the division between the mundane and the supramundane sphere was ultimately denied, the distinction between the wholesome dharmas on the mundane and supramundane levels was often seen as being problematic. As a result, a philosophical problem arose concerning how to explain the doctrinal contrast between the ultimate universality and the concrete particularities. In ancient East Asia this problem emerged centering on the two conflicting notions of the Buddha-nature (Skt. buddha-dhātu, alt. tathāgatagarbha, C. foxing 佛性), the universal spiritual capability innate in all sentient beings, and the icchantikas (C. yichanti 一闡提), “incorrigibles,” those who are devoid of the capability (or, the wholesome dharmas) to attain Buddhahood. This article discusses the philosophical conundrum entailed from doctrinal incompatibility between the universal capability to become a Buddha and the beings who lack the wholesome dharmas by examining the Silla scholar monk Wŏnhyo’s 元曉 (617–686) understanding of the four antinomies (Skt. catuṣkoṭi, C. siju 四句) on the Buddha-nature of the Nirvāṇa Sutra.