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It is said that Japan and Korea in the early-modern times had a ‘friendship’ relations for 260 years. One of the symbols was the Joseon delegation sent by Joseon to Japan. In 1811 , the final, the 12th Joseon delegations CTongsinsa) visited Tsushima. It was 24 years after shogun Ienari assumed the position of the 11th. Counting from the previous delegations, 47 years passed. The 12th Tongsinsa was also different from the previous ones in that the sovereign’s letters were exchanged in Tsushima instead of in Edo.
Most of the research on the negotiations over the 12th Korean delegation still relied on the study by Tabohashi Kiyoshi. However, especially in recent years, an analysis of the Korean letters exchanged between the Korean interpreters and the Japanese ones had been progressing, and it showed what kind of exchanges were actually made regarding the negotiations at the forefront between Japan and Korea .
In the historical materials written by Oda Ikugoro , an interpreter who did the prior discussion of the negotiations, he recorded a 10t of the actua1 exchanges that were not seen in the officia1 records of the Busan Weagwan, the forefront of dip1omacy.
Therefore, in this paper, 1’d 1ike to confirm the issues being dea1t with by the Tsushima clan, the Korean dynasty, and the Edo shogunate re1ated to the negotiations, and clarify the activities of interpreters in Weagwan, based on the record of the ‘fie1d’ of negotiations over the Korean de1egation. Then 1 tried to draw the aspects of Japan-Korea exchange in Weagwan, which supports the negotiation, to clarify the rea1ity of Japan-Korea dip10macy from the end of the 18 century to the beginning of the 19 century.
Unlike the usual route of instructions and orders, the negotiation of the 12th Joseon delegations was carried out secretly. An influential person of the Korean Dynasty ordered the interpreters to do so. As a result, when the key pillars had died, the negotiations stalled. Moreover, a case that some dip10matic documents were forged by the interpreters was revealed, and the negotiations got stuck.
On the other hand, in Japan, Karos, chief retainers of the Tsushima clan, who followed the shogunate’s intention, ordered a certain interpreters to negotiate in the forefront. Because they as well did not take the usual route of command, a power struggle within the clan affected the negotiations. In the end, the shogunate intervened to suppress the forces of the opponents. The political stability of the two countries had allowed making good progress on the negotiations.
In the background, however, there was a cooperative relationship between Korean and Japanese interpreters. They negotiated secretly with sharing information in depth, sometimes ousted the other interpreters who were interrupting the negotiations, and even collaborated to forge leUers to accomplish their aims.
These relationships between interpreters were created through daily exchanges. Sometimes they treat yangban who visited Weagwan ‘to see the Japanese' generously. It lead to some knowledge about the ‘behavior of Japanese' to yangban in the short term, but also lead to connections between yanban and interpreters in the long term. Behind the diplomatic negotiations, there was the ‘effort’ in the ‘field' . The diplomacy was supported by the connections between people who worked at the forefront of both countries.