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A Bribe and Corporate Performance : Causal Evidence from a Quasi-Natural Experiment

초록

영어

We examine how bribes affect corporate performance using a quasi-natural identification strategy. Specifically, we exploit the 2016 enactment of the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act in Korea (also known as Kim Young-ran Act) which limits firms’ bribery to public servants as an exogenous shock. We find that a firm’s level of bribery activities, proxied by its entertainment-related expenses, has a negative impact on its performance. In particular, firms that cut down on these expenses following the law’s enactment are found to exhibit a significant improvement in performance. Overall, our findings provide convincing evidence that bribery impairs firm performance.

목차

Abstract
1. Introduction
2. the Improper Solicitation and Graft Act in Korea
3. Empirical Strategy
3.1. Instrumental variable analysis
3.2. Difference-in-differences analysis
4. Data
4.1. Sample Selection – Data Source / screening
4.2. Variable Measurement (Construction)
4.3. Descriptive summary
5. Empirical results
5.1. Baseline specification
5.2. Endogeneity control
6. Conclusion
Reference

저자정보

  • Jieun Im
  • Woojin Kim

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