원문정보
초록
영어
We use the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) to examine the link between customer concentration and earnings management. We find that SOX has led low-customer-concentration firms to reduce accrualbased earnings management more than high-customer-concentration firms have, suggesting that corporate governance to ensure high-quality earnings is more important when firms have lower customer concentration. The effect of customer concentration is especially pronounced when firms are involved in higher relationship-specific investments. The results are robust to accounting for endogeneity, alternative measures of discretionary accruals and of customer concentration. We additionally show that operating performance increase more in low-customer-concentration firms after SOX.
목차
1. Introduction
2. Related literature and hypothesis development
2.1. Customer concentration and earnings management
2.2. The differential effect of SOX
3. Research Design
3.1. Data and sample description
3.2. Measures of earnings management—accrual-based earnings management
3.3. Empirical model
4. Empirical results
4.1. Baseline regression results
4.2. The strength of the customer-supplier relationship and the effectiveness of customer concentration
4.3. Endogeneity of customer concentration and earnings management
4.4. Robustness of the main results
4.5. The effect on operating performance
4.6. Customer concentration and real earnings management
5. Conclusion
References