원문정보
Protection of Foreign Investors and Emergency Situation on the Investment Treaty
초록
영어
The developing countries sign bilateral investment treaties(BITs) to promote foreign investment, thereby increasing the amount of capital and associated technology that flows their territories. The basic assumptions behind BITs are that a bilateral treaty with clear and enforceable rules to protect and facilitate foreign investment reduces risks that the investor would otherwise face and that such reductions in risks encourage investment. Most BITs pursue the objective of investment protection by establishing rules about the host country’s treatment of foreign investment, and processes for enforcing these rules. The rules restrain the ability of host governments in dealing with foreign investors and investments. By the way, several BITs contain exception provision that limits the applicability of investor protection under the BIT in exceptional circumstances. These exception clauses allow states to take actions otherwise inconsistent with the treaty when, for example, the actions are necessary for the protection of essential security, the maintenance of public order, or to respond to a public health emergency. These exception provisions can weaken the protection of foreign investors prescribed by the BIT. As long as the host-state’s actions are taken in pursuit of one of the permissible objectives specified in the exception clause, acts otherwise prohibited by the BIT do not constitute breaches of the BIT and state should face no liability under the BIT. Near the end of 2001, a severe financial crisis occurred in Argentina. The crisis was fueled by the collapse of the currency regime. In response to the crisis, Argentina adopted a number of emergency measures to stabilize the economy. While these measures did help stabilize the economy and restore public support for the Argentina government, many foreign investors faced serious losses and turned to their BITs for legal protection. Most BITs resolve disputes through arbitration. Consequently, Argentina quickly became a party to approximately 43 ICSID arbitrations. Faced with a large number of claims, Argentina sought refuge in a broad reading of the essential security interests exception, arguing both that the exception applied and that it was self-judging. All of the arbitral tribunals that have addressed the issue have accepted Argentina’s argument that measures to protect a party’s essential security interests could include measures addressing economic crisis. Unlike the exceptions typically crafted for economic crises, however, the essential security interests exception provides little guidance regarding the circumstances to which it applies and includes no limiting safeguards. It is an exception that overbalances all BIT obligations when it applies and the scope of its application is not carefully defined. For these reasons, the arbitral tribunals have been reluctant to accept Argentina’s argument that its measures were necessary to protect its essential security interests. The tribunals accepted the claim that Argentina’s essential security interests were at stake, but then carefully scrutinized the question of whether the measures taken were necessary, concluding in some instances that they were not. Thus, far preferable might have been a more carefully crafted exception that addressed economic crises explicitly and incorporated limiting safeguards into the exception that preserved at least some BIT principles. The primary purpose of a BIT is to ensure that foreign investment is treated in accordance with the rule of law. For this reason, self-judging exceptions are especially troubling. A provision that exempts treaty provision from judicial or arbitral process is very difficult to reconcile with investment treaty intended to establish the rule of law.
한국어
투자협정은 외국투자자에게 제공하는 투자보호를 강조하고 있다. 투자협정의 체 결로 인해 외국투자를 유치한 국가가 경제위기에 처하였을 때 이를 극복하기 위한 대응조치를 취할 수 있는 국가의 재량이 상당히 제한될 수 있는데, 이러한 대응조치 가 투자협정이 보장하고 있는 외국투자자의 권리를 침해할 수 있기 때문이다. 그래서 경제위기상황에 대응하기 위하여 투자협정들은 예외규정을 두고 있다. 경제적 위기를 대처하기 위한 예외규정은 아주 세밀하게 만들어야 할 필요성이 아르헨티나의 경제위기에 관한 사건의 중재판정에서 잘 나타났다. 아르헨티나의 경 우에서 본 바와 같이 관련된 중재판정들은 아르헨티나가 주장한 긴급피난의 주장을 대체로 받아들이지 않았으며, 투자협정상의 예외규정에 의한 투자협정상의 의무면 제에 대해서도 부정적 반응을 나타내었다. 아르헨티나와 미국간 투자협정에서 본질 적 안보이익을 보호하기 위하여 예외규정이 적용되는 요건과 상황에 대한 기준을 상세히 규정하고 있지 않았으므로, 중재판정부는 아르헨티나의 조치가 본질적 안보 이익을 보호하는데 필요한 조치라는 주장을 받아들이지 않았던 것이다. 그래서 경제 적 위기를 대처하도록 만들어진 예외규정을 주의 깊게 만드는 것이 투자협정상의 의무의 성격에 비추어보아 특히 중요하며, 예외규정 내에 투자협정상의 의무를 면제 하는 보존조치를 취하는 상세한 기준에 관한 사항을 삽입하여야 투자협정의 원칙이 최소한도 준수될 수 있을 것이다. 투자협정의 기본적 목적은 외국투자자가 법규칙에 따라 대우를 받을 수 있도록 보장하는 것이다. 이러한 이유로 투자협정상의 본질적 안보이익에 관한 예외규정의 적용요건을 스스로 판단한다는(self-judging) 주장은 혼란을 가중시킨다. 투자분쟁이 발생할 시에 사법적 절차나 중재절차에서 회피하려는 투자협정상의 예외규정은 국 제투자의 보호를 위한 법규칙을 확립하려는 의도를 가진 투자협정과 조화를 이루기 는 어렵다.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 아르헨티나의 경제위기의 경우
1. 배경
2. 중재판정의 결과
Ⅲ. 예외규정을 통한 외국투자자와 투자유치국간의 이익의 조정
1. 예외규정의 활용
2. 투자협정상 예외규정의 “스스로 판단한다는(self-judging)” 문구의문제점
Ⅳ. 결어
<참고문헌>
