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We consider a patent signaling model for startup financing where an entrepreneur signals his type by acquiring patents and investors have coarse information about the entrepreneur’s true success probability. By invoking an extension of Cho and Kreps’ (1987) Intuitive Criterion adapted to our model, we obtain the least-cost perfect Bayesian equilibrium, in which a high-type entrepreneur may receive a lower equity share despite acquiring a higher patent level than in the benchmark, where investors do not face coarse information. This implies that coarse information faced by investors may lead to less effective patent signaling than in the benchmark.
목차
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. The Model
2.1 Startup Financing
2.2 Payoffs to Agents
3. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
3.1 Separating PBE
3.2 Pooling PBE
4. Refinements of PBEs
5. Main Implications
6. Conclusions
References
1. Introduction
2. The Model
2.1 Startup Financing
2.2 Payoffs to Agents
3. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
3.1 Separating PBE
3.2 Pooling PBE
4. Refinements of PBEs
5. Main Implications
6. Conclusions
References
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자료제공 : 네이버학술정보