원문정보
피인용수 : 0건 (자료제공 : 네이버학술정보)
초록
영어
This study examines whether there are agency conflicts within firms that issue preferred stocks, and whether agency conflicts affect to tax avoidance levels of the firm. Firms with preferred stocks have agency problems because they can consolidate managers’ rights compared to firms with only common stocks. This paper studies the degree of tax avoidance of firms that issue preferred stocks and finds that because of the existence of differentiated voting rights in the firm, the degree of tax avoidance is reduced.
목차
Abstract
Introduction
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Empirical Method
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Empirical Results
Summary and Conclusion
References
Introduction
Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
Empirical Method
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Empirical Results
Summary and Conclusion
References
저자정보
참고문헌
자료제공 : 네이버학술정보