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초록
영어
We examine executive compensation structures with a focus on family business groups in Korea. Our results show that Korean family business groups provide 60% more total compensation to CEOs who are family members than to professional CEOs. This excessive increment is not based on performance-contingent payments, but on fixed payments. Our propensity score matching and difference-in-differences analyses robustly support these results. Further, we find that operation of internal capital markets, CEO talents, CEO stock ownership, and family board membership do not explain the excessive compensation of family CEOs in family business groups. The evidence indicates rent extraction through executive compensation in family business groups.
목차
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Data
3. Empirical models and results
3.1 Univariate tests
3.2 Levels of compensation, chaebols, and family CEOs
3.3 Performance-contingent compensation, chaebols, and family CEOs
3.4 Robustness tests
4. Conclusion
5. REFERENCES
1. Introduction
2. Data
3. Empirical models and results
3.1 Univariate tests
3.2 Levels of compensation, chaebols, and family CEOs
3.3 Performance-contingent compensation, chaebols, and family CEOs
3.4 Robustness tests
4. Conclusion
5. REFERENCES
저자정보
참고문헌
자료제공 : 네이버학술정보