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초록
영어
The behavioral finance literature attributes failed M&As to CEO overconfidence. We investigate the source of CEO overconfidence that leads to failed M&As. Among various determinants of CEO overconfidence, we propose that power-led CEO overconfidence delivers undesirable consequences in corporate investments. Using CEO-level data, we find that CEO power increases the probability of a CEO being overconfident.We also show that power-driven overconfident CEOs tend to complete more deals regardless of circumstances, do stock acquisitions, and make value-destroying acquisitions, relative to nonoverconfident CEOs. The results suggest that previous studies on M&As by overconfident CEOs are mainly led by power-driven overconfident CEOs.
목차
ABSTRACT
I. Introduction
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
III. Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics
IV. Empirical Results
V. Conclusion
References
Appendix A
I. Introduction
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
III. Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistics
IV. Empirical Results
V. Conclusion
References
Appendix A
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