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We introduced productivity difference and Bertrand competition and investigate the timing of trade policy. We found that, in the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trade policy game with productivity difference, both governments set their policies simultaneously at the first stage when firms are Bertrand competitors. In this case, the domestic government will choose a positive import tariff and a positive production subsidy, and the foreign government will choose an export tax.
목차
Abstract
I . Introduction
II . The Basic Bertrand Model
III. Simultaneous Move Trade Policy Game
IV. Stackelberg Game when the Foreign Government is the First Mover
V. Stackelberg Game when the Domestic Government is the First Mover
VI. The timing of Policy Decision.
VII. Concluding Remarks
References
I . Introduction
II . The Basic Bertrand Model
III. Simultaneous Move Trade Policy Game
IV. Stackelberg Game when the Foreign Government is the First Mover
V. Stackelberg Game when the Domestic Government is the First Mover
VI. The timing of Policy Decision.
VII. Concluding Remarks
References
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