earticle

영어

Modern corporation laws generally approve the squeeze-out system of minority shareholders in order to grant the buyers the whole acquisition pathways, cut operating cost, and improve operating efficiency. In response to both the interests of controlling and minority shareholders, the system includes squeeze-out right of controlling shareholders and sell-out right of minority shareholders. After studying relevant legislations of Germany, England and America, South Korea stipulated the squeeze-out system in its commercial law in 2011. However, China has not regulated the overall system. In its Securities Law(2014 Amendment) the Article 97 says “Upon the expiration of a term for acquisition, where the share distribution of a target company fails to meet the requirements of listing, ……, the shareholders that still hold the shares of the target company have the right to sell their shares in light of the equal terms as stipulated in the relevant tender offer.”, which seems quite not thorough. This stipulation is very similar to the minority shareholders’ squeeze-out right, yet it didn’t grant controlling shareholders the sell-out right. Observing recent years’ legislative trend, we can see that China may import squeeze-out system in the coming years. In 2014, in one of CSRC’s formal exposure drafts the commission already proposed that the system should be integrated in the articles which regulate listed company’s active delisting. Some articles in Securities Law(2015 Draft) of China also proposed the system’s ideology, yet those articles are too humble and some concepts including the concept of Non-Affiliated Shareholders are not quite clear, which subsequently may lead to difficulties in judicial application. Besides, seen from the perspective of its values, the squeeze-out system may not be necessarily applicable to the acquisition of listed company. Nevertheless, after the emergence of legislative and judicial experience, the Company Law of China can fully stipulate the system in its regulation. The research studies and comments on Securities Law(2015 Draft), and gives advice on a full import of squeeze-out system in the Company Law of China.

중국어

为了给收购人提供完全收购的途径、以及使公司削减经营成本、提高经营效率，现代公司法普遍认可了少数股东强制挤出制度。为了平衡控股股东和少数股东的双方利益，该制度由控股股东的股份强制购买请求权（squeeze-out right）和少数股东的股份回购请求权(sell-out right)构成。 2011年，韩国通过考察德国、英国、美国等相关立法例，在商法中引入了控股股东可以强制取得全部少数股份的制度。中国对少数股东的强制挤出还没有具体立法，只是在《证券法》第97条中规定，收购期限届满后，被收购公司终止上市时，少数股东可以向收购人行使回购请求权。该规定类似于少数股东的股份回购请求权，但是并没有赋予控股股东强制购买请求权。观察近几年的相关立法动向，可以看出中国即将引入少数股东强制挤出制度。2014年证监会的《关于改革完善并严格实施上市公司退市制度的若干意见》中已经主张在公司主动退市中引入该制度，并且在2015年《证券法》（修订草案）中已经具体设立了相关条文，但条文的规定过于简单，而且“非关联股东”等部分概念尚未作出清晰的界定，可能存在司法适用上的困难。另外，从少数股东强制挤出制度的制度价值来看，该制度并不一定适用于上市公司收购，积累一定的立法经验和司法实践后，可以通过修改《公司法》全面引入该制度。本文将对中国《证券法》（修订草案）的相关规定作出评价，并为今后中国《公司法》中全面引入该制度提出立法建议。