초록
영어
I propose a one‐period model of transaction mechanism choices between a posted price market and an auction market, considering agents’ time preference. Buyers with low search costs search in the posted price market and purchase the products at the beginning of the period. Buyers with high search costs participate in the auction market and get the products at the end of the period. It is shown that there are equilibrium numbers of buyers and sellers in each market, where agents cannot benefit from deviating from their choices, under an assumption about the distribution of buyers and sellers. In addition, when the agents are impatient, some of the listed prices may be higher than the expected winning bid. Moreover, the expected listed price in the search market may be higher than the expected winning bid in the auction market, when the agents are very impatient. It is also shown that the expected winning bid is lower than the expected listed price when buyers and/or sellers have uniformly distributed discount factors.
한국어
이 논문은 시간선호가 있는 경우 판매자와 소비자가 확정가격시장과 경매시장 중 어떤 시장유형을 선택하는지에 관한 분석모형이다. 균형상태에서는 시장유형을 변경함으로써 더 이상의 효용을 얻을 수 없는 균형상태가 있고, 시간선호함수 및 이윤과 효용함수가 주어진다면 그러한 각각의 시장에 참가하는 균형적인 소비자 및 판매자의 수와 그 거래가격을 구할 수 있다는 것을 보여준다.
목차
I. Introduction
Previous Literature
II. The Model
1. Search Market
2. Auction Market
III. Market Equilibrium
IV. An Equilibrium with a Uniform Distribution
V. A Modification with Heterogeneous Agents
1. Heterogeneous Buyers
2. Heterogeneous Sellers
3. Heterogeneous Buyers and Sellers
VI. Summary and Implications
References
Appendix
초록