earticle

영어

Since the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom (UK) has intervened militarily in a number of security crises, engaging in so-called wars of choice and it seems likely that the future will see more operations such as Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Afghanistan.In 2003, the UK participated in the US-ledcoalition that invaded Iraq and quickly overthrew the Ba’ath Party and captured Saddam Hussein. Despite the successes of the initial combat operations in Iraq, the drawn-out anti-insurgency campaign that followed has proved challenging and unfruitful in restabilising the state. The 2011 withdrawal of forces left a fractured state that necessitated re-intervention as early as 2014. The unresolved instability of Iraq to date demonstrates the failures of the coalition to institute peace and to transition the state out of war. This paper, with a focus on British Defence Doctrine, explores the approaches that contributed to both the success and the failures of the post-conflict stabilization of Iraq.It concludes that, as a result of the military predominance within the strategic planning process, the focus on destruction of strategic centres of gravity does not contribute positively to the successful transition from war-fighting to peace-restoration operations. An earlier focus must be placed upon rebuilding campaigns and a holistic approach must pay more consideration to stabilization in order that the greater political aims of a campaign are ensured. This paper proposes three alternative approaches in which operations focus not on the destruction of the old order but the creation of a new one.