earticle

영어

After the Cold War, there are two major trends of the nuclear security structure on the Korean Peninsula: Firstly, North Korea has tried to replace the peninsula "one-way nuclear deterrent" structure with "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure, and form a "non-balanced nuclear deterrent" structure to strengthen nuclear weapons activities step by step; Secondly, the United States has been vigorously intervened in the Asia-Pacific affairs, implementing the "Asia-Pacific rebalancing" strategy, and taking the DPRK nuclear activities as a reason to strongly promote the missile defense system building in the East Asian region especially in the South Korea. Both of them are the result of the vicious interaction of safety in Korean peninsula, which may eventually change the nuclear security structure of Northeast Asia overall. North Korea's nuclear weaponization services as one of the core security issues of the Korean Peninsula after the Cold War, which is the result of the vicious interaction between the internal and external elements of the Korean Peninsula security structure. After the third nuclear test, the DPRK had taken the nuclear weapons as a strategic issue instead of tactical chips, which had been causing the Korean Peninsula security dilemma around the DPRK nuclear issue increasingly difficult to resolve. The study on the internal logic of the DPRK's nuclear issue may contribute to find negotiating space in a seemingly unexplained security dilemma. There are two basic forces which have been driving North Korea for nuclear power. On the one hand, it’s trying to reduce the possibility of waging "hot war" by the Korea-US alliance to maintain regime and system security through establishing an "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure with them. On the other hand, they try to weaken South Korea's dominance of the Korean Peninsula reunification issue and strive for the reciprocity on it. Under the impetus of the two major powers, the DPRK gradually built a prototype structure of the "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" against the ROKUS alliance after five nuclear tests. The structure of "nuclear deterrence without power equilibrium" is concerned with the steady growth of conventional armaments on the basis of steady economic development. This “nuclear deterrent” structure, legally defending the regime and system security, is the ultimate goal of North Korea's nuclear-weapon effort. If the DPRK regime eventually did not "collapse" under the internal and external pressure, it would work towards this ultimate goal. THAAD taken into the ROK may produce an illusion for the North Korea, that the nuclear weapons from the DPRK had formed an "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure with the KoreanAmerican alliance at least in the psychological level. THAAD may be taken as an excellent evidence by the North Korea, that the Korean-American alliance began to take strong reaction and hedge measures to deal with the new security structure in Korean Peninsula. When the North Korea believes that the "asymmetric nuclear deterrent" structure had been established and would not be broken in a short term, its nuclear activities will gradually enter into the "Nuclear Deterrence without Power Equilibrium "structural construction period. During the construction phase of the "Nuclear Deterrence without Power Equilibrium ", the nuclear weapons development will gradually give way to the conventional armaments promotion, at the same time, economic development which services as the prerequisite of conventional armaments promotion would become the basis and core work of the DPRK. At this stage, North Korea's demand for economic development is both a subjective desire and an objective necessity. Economic issues will provide a huge space for negotiating space to break the peninsula security dilemma.