earticle

영어

Korea initiated its industrial policy in the 1960s. The main focus of Korean industrial policy in the late 1970s shifted from light industry toward the heavy and chemical sector. This sector needed the integration of the supply chain in order to produce final goods because many parts, components and materials are combined into its products. Generally, small and medium-sized enterprises (SEMs) produce intermediate goods, and then supply those to large enterprises (LEs). LEs, meanwhile, produce final goods, and then export those to the world market. As a result, the increase in exports of LEs leads to an increase in turnover of SMEs which supply intermediate goods to LEs. This virtuous circle has continued for the last forty years. We call this a trickle down effect by the vertical integration between LEs and SMEs. According to Adam Smith, the vertical integration facilitates both division of labor and specialization because the economic unit has a tendency to trade and exchange his own things with others. Also, he addressed that in order to accomplish division of labor and specialization, external transactions by contract are more effective than intra-firm transactions in the group. However, fair distribution by LEs has not been well implemented. LEs have more benefits than SMEs. Meanwhile, as the global market becomes more competitive, LEs need higher quality parts and materials. For this reason, LEs tend to procure parts and materials through intra-firm transaction in large business group rather than external vertical transaction with SMEs. This purchasing behavior of LEs is to minimize transaction cost and maximize utility, theoretically based on Ronald Coase’s ‘The Nature of the Firm’ which introduces the concept of transaction costs to explain the nature and limits of firms. Thus, the government entered the market and began to regulate ‘winner takes it all’ and intra-firm transaction. Over the past five years, intra-firm transactions of LEs have declined, not because of government regulations, but because of the decline in turnover of LEs. On the other hand, LEs use intra-firm transactions as a means of expedient corporate succession rather than utility maximization. Intra-firm transactions in large business group have a negative impact on the business and management environment of SMEs. As results of analyzing the influence of internal transactions of LEs on SMEs, the number of enterprises and employees decreased by 63 and 25,738, respectively when intra-firm transactions of LEs increased by 10%. Meanwhile, the turnover of SMEs increased by about 8 trillion won. However, the increase on turnover of SMEs reflects the industrial speciality of heavy and chemical industries. If LEs increase intra-firm transactions with their affiliates, LEs have to source the necessary parts from outside. LEs will have to source the necessary parts from outside. Eventually, the increase in intra-firm transactions of LEs leads to the increase in production of SMEs in heavy and chemical industries. But, conversely, SMEs in light industry have severe consequences of reducing turnover and closing down. The government should now enter the market, seeking to curb intra-firm transactions of LEs and maximize market utility. In this regard, Germany’s ordo liberalism has great implications. According to ordo liberalism, a free market economy can be formed when it is organized and managed by the government. In order to realize this, competition policy is necessary to operate a market function, to create an environment of fair competition, to maintain a balance of society, and to compete for a society dominated by individual responsibility and ethics.

한국어

그동안 한국경제의 성장을 견인했던 산업정책–대기업과 중소기업의 수직적 계열화는 ‘승자독식’ 문제를 드러냈다. ‘승자독식’은 기업 간 불균형은 물론 경제와 사회의 불균형으로 이어졌다. 그러나 대기업은 내부 계열사와 수직적 계열화를 활용해 내부거래를 활성화하고 있는데 거래비용을 줄이고 효용을 극대화하고자 함이다. 이 결과 산업정책의 문제점인 대기업의 ‘승자독식’은 더욱 커지는 추세다. 대기업의 내부거래는 지난 5년간 전반적으로 감소하는 추세이다. 이는 정부의 규제 탓이 아니라 대기업의 매출 감소 탓이다. 또한, 대기업의 내부거래는 단순히 효용 극대화에 그치지 않고 편법적인 경영승계의 수단으로 활용되고 있다. 총수있는 대기업, 총수일가 지분과 총수 2세 지분율이 많을수록 내부거래가 더 많기 때문이다. 대기업의 내부거래는 중소기업에 부정 효과와 긍정 효과가 동시에 나타났다. 실증분석 결과 대기업의 내부거래 비중이 10% 증가하면, 제조 중소기업의 사업체는 63개, 종사자 수는 2만 5,738명 감소했으나 제조 중소기업의 위탁기업(대기업) 납품금액은 8조 5,008억 원 증가했다. 이러한 긍정 효과는 중화학공업의 산업적 특수성이 반영된 것으로 대기업 계열사 간 내부거래가 증가했다면 외부에서 부품 조달 또한 필요하기 때문이다. 이는 대기업의 내부거래 증가로 중소기업의 생산 증가라는 외부 유발효과가 발생함을 의미한다. 그러나 경공업은 대기업의 내부거래 증가로 사업체, 종사자, 납품금액 모두 뚜렷하게 감소했다. 이제 정부는 적절한 규제를 통해 대기업의 내부거래를 억제하고 시장의 효용을 극대화할 방안을 찾아야 할 것이다. 이러한 관점에서 독일의 질서자유주의는 시사하는 바가 크다. 질서자유주의에 따르면, 자유로운 시장경제는 정부에 의해 조직되고 관리될 때 형성이 가능하다. 이를 구체적으로 실현하기 위해 시장기능의 작동, 공정경쟁의 환경 조성, 사회의 균형 유지, 개인의 책임과 윤리가 지배하는 사회를 위한 경쟁정책이 필요하다.