earticle

영어

This paper examines the relationship between performance evaluation results and earnings management using data of public enterprises. There have been few studies analyzing earnings management practices in public enterprises. Cha and Kim (2010) show that managers of public enterprises manage earnings to avoid loss, as like profit-corporations. Yoon (2013) suggests that managers of public enterprises have incentives to manage earnings for maximizing compensation and minimizing tax. Chung et al.(2013) examine the relationship between performance measure characteristic and a manager’s incentive to manage earnings using data of public enterprises. Our study focuses on earnings management incentives based on results of performance evaluation conducted by government. The sample includes 93 firm-years from 2011 to 2014 selected based on the availability of financial data and government performance evaluation result. The government performance evaluation assesses annual management performance and operating system of public enterprises. The government performance evaluation is performed by the committee that receives a delegation of government. Based on government performance evaluation result, public enterprises getting a good rating (as grade S, A, B or C) receive bonus payment and budget increase, but public enterprises getting a poor rating (as grade D or E) receive no bonus payment and penalty; budget reduction, recommendation for removal of CEO, and submission of management improvement plan. Under the reward and punishment system of the performance evaluation, this study hypothesizes that there is a significant relationship between performance evaluation result and a manager’s earnings management. First, we investigate whether a manager of public enterprises receiving poor ratings conducts accrual-based earnings management. The discretionary accruals are estimated using the Modified Jones Model suggested by Dechow et al. (1995). The results show that the manager of public enterprises receiving poor ratings decreases income-increasing accrual-based earnings management, supporting our first hypothesis. Second, we examine whether a manager of public enterprises receiving poor ratings conducts real activity-based earnings management. We use Roychowdhury’s model (2006) to measure the magnitude of real earnings management. The results show that the manager of public enterprises receiving poor ratings reduces income-increasing earnings management using real activities (abnormal operating cash flow), providing evidence partially consistent with our second hypothesis. As an additional test, we examine whether a manager of public enterprises receiving good ratings from the year before last evaluation and the poor ratings from last year evaluation conducts accrual- and real activity-based earnings management. The results show that the manager of such public enterprises reduces both accrual-based earnings management and income-increasing earnings management using real activities (abnormal operating cash flow) more than others. This result means that the manager reduces much more earnings management when public enterprises' performance evaluation ratings become worse than before. Such behavior of managers is caused by characteristics of government performance evaluation which assesses not only financial performance of public enterprises but also management transparency, policy implementation, and other non-financial factor. Thus, managers of public enterprises which received poor ratings on government performance evaluation cannot improve the evaluation result by income-increasing earnings management. The results above show that government performance evaluation grade is negatively associated with income-increasing earnings management and managers of public enterprises pay attention on government performance evaluation result. Public enterprises receive rewards or penalty and get subsequent review from government as a result of the evaluation, and managers of public enterprises receiving poor ratings are committed to fair and transparent management, rather than income-increasing earnings management. This study contributes to the literature by focusing on performance evaluation conducted by the government and analyzing empirically that manager’s earnings management can be affected by the grade of performance evaluation. In addition, the study has policy implications in that it validates the purposes of performance evaluation in order to promote a fair and transparent management of public enterprises.

한국어

본 연구는 2011년부터 2014년까지 93개의 공기업 표본을 대상으로 경영실적 평가 결과가 재무제표 이익조정에 미치는 영향에 대해 분석하였다. 공기업 경영실적 평가는 공기업의 매년도 경영노력과 성과를 평가하는 제도이다. 평가 결과가 평균이하인 공기업에 대해서는 경영평가 성과급의 미지급 및 예산 감액 등의 패널티가 주어지며 정부의 사후관리를 받게 될 수 있다. 따라서 본 연구는 전년도에 평균에 못 미치는 경영실적 평가 등급을 받은 기관의 경영자가 당해년도의 재무제표 항목에 대해 이익조정을 행하고 있는지 여부에 대해 발생액 이익조정과 실제 이익조정의 측면에서 실증분석 하였다. 분석 결과 전년도 경영실적 평가 결과로 평균 미만인 D나 E등급을 받은 경영자는 당해년도 재무제표에 대하여 재량적 발생액 이익조정 및 영업현금흐름 실제 이익조정을 적게 하는 것으로 나타났다. 또한 추가 분석을 통해서는 전전년도의 경영실적 평가 결과가 C등급이상이면서 전년도에 경영실적 평가 결과가 D 또는 E등급인 공기업이 그렇지 않은 공기업보다 당년도의 이익조정을 더 많이 감소시키고 있음을 알 수 있었다. 즉, 기본분석에서 전년도 경영실적평가가 좋지 못한 공기업의 경영자가 이익조정을 적게 하고 있음을 확인했다면 추가분석에서는 경영실적 평가의 결과가 나빠진 공기업의 경영자가 이익조정을 감소시키고 있음을 확인할 수 있었다. 결과를 종합하면 경영실적 평가 결과가 좋지 못한 공기업에 주어지는 패널티 및 정부의 사후관리로 인해 해당 공기업의 경영자는 다음 해의 재무제표 항목에 대해 이익조정을 적게 하게 되고, 이에 따라 공기업 재무제표의 투명성이 높아지는 효과가 있음을 알 수 있다. 본 연구는 공공기관 경영실적 평가 결과에 주목하여 경영실적 평가등급에 따른 상벌 및 사후조치가 공공기관의 투명한 회계를 유도하고 있음을 실증분석 하였다는 점에서 그 의의가 있다. 또한 공기업 경영실적 평가 결과에 따른 정부의 사후조치의 유효성을 일부 검증하였으므로 정책적으로도 의미가 있다고 할 수 있다.