earticle

영어

Managers have some incentives to manipulate earnings intentionally and have two tools to manage it. Those are accrual based earnings management (AEM) and real earnings management (REM). Most of studies have been previously disparate. Managers show opportunistic behavior of increasing earnings with these tools. Graham et al. (2005) finds that managers prefer real activities manipulation over accrual based manipulation because the real earnings management have direct effects on cash flows. Cohen and Zarowin (2010) explain two reasons why managers have an preference of real earnings management over accrual based earnings manipulation. First, real earings manipulation is safer from inspection of audit and regulator than accrual based strategy. Second, real activities manipulation is the last option to increase reported income. Sometimes only accrual based manipulation is not enough to meet the threshold which manager want to perform. According to these reasons, managers are likely to regard two manipulation as complimentary methods. But Zang (2012)’s study investigate tradeoffs between two methods. She concludes that managers utilize the two manipulation as substitutes. According to Cohen and Zarowin (2010)’s comment about a preference for real earnings management and a cost of earnings manipulation, these make firms regard two as complementary rather than substitution relation. To find the association between accrual based and real earnings management in this study, we try to investigates the influence of Big4 audit firms and audit tenure which is proxy variables of audit scrutiny on the level of accrual and real earnings management in Korean firms. Several previous researches have already showed that Big4 and audit tenure controls the degree of accrual based earnings management in firms. Audit scrutiny is an important factor to influence the degree of manipulation through boosting accruals. Audit scrutiny does not have effect on real earnings manipulate. The influence of it on accruals based earnings manipulation may have indirect effect on the level of real earnings management. If two manipulation strategies are substitutionary relationship, high scrutiny get managers to increase the amount of real earnings management because it is hard for them to manipulate accruals. If one is complementary thing of the other, the effect of audit scrutiny on real earnings management is changed. We suggest an hypothesis below. Hypothesis: The quality of audit influences the degree of real earnings manipulation. The study finds followings through empirical analyses. First, Big4 audit firms decreases both the degree of accrual and real earnings management in firms. second, audit tenure has negative relationship with the extent of discretion accruals as a proxy for measure of accrual based earnings management. Based on these empirical evidences, we conclude that manger use two tools of earings manipulation simultaneously to increase earnings. in other words, two methods of managing earings are not substitutionary but complementary relation. It is rational result considering that concentrating on one, it increases cost of manipulation. In addition, we run one more regression analysis in which the dependent variable is AEM (REM) including REM (AEM) as the independent variable. We find the positive association between them, suggesting that those are complementary relation rather than substitutionary relation. It is different result of Zang (2012)’s study which try a regression analysis in which the dependent variable is AEM with unexpected REM find the negative relation.

한국어

재량적 발생액을 의도적으로 증가시켜 장부상 이익을 부풀리는 경영자의 기회주의적 행동이 여러 연구들에서 발견된다. 감사인 유형과 계속감사기간은 이러한 발생액 이익조정을 통제하는 중요한 요인이다. 최근 들어 발생액을 부풀리는 이익조정방법뿐만이 아니라 실제 영업활동을 통해 이익을 증가시키는 현상이 관측된다. 즉, 경영자는 이익을 부풀릴 수 있는 두 가지의 이익조정 도구(발생액 이익조정과 실제이익조정)를 보유하고 있다. 본 연구에서는 감사인 유형과 계속감사기간이 발생액 이익조정뿐만 아니라 실제이익조정에 미치는 영향력을 검증한다. 외국계 회계법인과 전략적 제휴를 맺은 회계법인(Big4)을 감사인으로 선임한 기업들이 그렇지 않은 기업에 비해 발생액 이익조정과 실제이익조정 모두가 낮은 수준이다. 이에 반해 계속 감사기간(Tenure)이 길수록 발생액 이익조정을 줄이는 영향력은 존재하지만 실질이익조정을 감소시키는 역할은 명확하지 않다. 외국법인과 전략적 제휴를 맺은 외부감사인 또는 동일 감사인에게 장기간 감사를 받게 된다면 발생액을 이용해 장부상의 이익을 조작하기는 어려워 질 것이다. 그렇지만 경영자들이 회계상의 이익조정을 대체하는 수단으로 실제이익조정을 선택하지는 않는다. 추가적으로 실제이익조정정도가 발생액 이익조정에 미치는 영향을 분석한 결과 양(+)의 관계를 확인했다. 이는 경영자들이 두 이익조정을 보완적으로 사용하고 있음을 재확인시켜주는 증거이다