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논문검색

소유지배괴리도가 조세회피와 기업가치의 관계에 미치는 영향

원문정보

The effect of the wedge between voting right and cash flow right on the relationship between tax avoidance and Firm value

이윤경

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초록

영어

This study examines the effect of wedge between voting right and cash flow right(WEDGE) on the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value. There are two alternative views on the effect of corporate tax avoidance on firm value. Traditionally, corporate tax avoidance is considered a value enhancing activities, because it decreases cash outflows and thus increase after-tax cash flows, net assets and financial slack of a firm. This view implicitly assumes that the costs of tax avoidance are less important and specifically, indirect costs are insignificant. However, agency view argues that corporate tax avoidance destroys firm value, since it increases firm's opacity and thus facilitates managerial opportunistic behaviors. From the agency view, there are potential agency costs in the form of rent extraction by managers, reputational costs, and corporate transparency problem. These non-tax costs may offset the increasing value of corporate tax avoidance. Prior research has expected to enhance firm value by tax avoidance under the traditional view; however, from the agency view, the non-tax costs have increased and they have a detrimental impact on firm value in the recent research. Korean corporate governance practice are characterized by the dominance of large business group, so called Chaebol. In developing countries such as Korea, the agency problem between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders occurs more frequently than between shareholders and managers which is considered traditional agency problem. Also, the large business group in Korea normally have pyramidal structure and cross-shareholdings which enable controlling shareholders to control the entire companies belonging to the large business group even with only a small percentage of direct ownership. As the WEDGE increases, controlling shareholders have an incentive to pursue their private interests by transferring wealth from minority shareholders to themselves. These kind of bebavior of the controlling shareholders can influence on the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value. This study defined tax avoidance as the reduction of explicit tax payments over time through all means of income reported to shareholders (Dyreng et al.2008). This stuy uses long-run CASH ETR as a measure of tax avoidance. Long-run CASH ETR measured by total cash taxes paid summed over three years(or five years), scaled by pretax income summed over three years(or five years). This stuy adjusted long-run CASH ETR multiplied (-1). This study uses Tobin's Q as a measure of firm value. The sample consists of Korean firms that belong to large business group over the period 2001-2011. The sample size is 436 firm-year observations for three-year CASH ETR. The ownership data are publicly available, disclosed by Online Provision of Enterprises Informaton System(OPNI) of the Fair Trade Commission. Tax paid data are collected from Data Analysis, Retrieval and Transfer System(DART) provided by Financial Supervisory Service in Korea. Other control variable are retrieved from KIS-VALUE LIBRARY database. The results are as follows. The result shows the negative effect of tax avoidance on firm value increases as the WEDGE increases. This result might be because controlling shareholders are better able to exploit external shareholders as WEDGE greater. It is implying that controlling shareholders use tax avoidance as a device of temporary opportunism. This study contributes to the literature by providing evidence that firms’ governance characteristics represented by the WEDGE affect the relationship between tax avoidance and firm value.

한국어

본 연구는 2001년부터 2011년까지 대규모기업집단에 소속된 유가증권 상장기업을 대상으로 소유지배괴리도가 조세회피와 기업가치 간의 관계에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 소유지배괴리도는 지배주주의 의결권과 소유권의 차이를 말한다. 소유지배괴리도가 커지게 되면 지배주주는 소액주주의 권리를 침해하여 자신의 사적 이익을 추구할 가능성이 높아지게 된다. 소유지배괴리도가 커서 대리인 문제가 발생하면 조세회피는 기업가치에 부정적인 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 즉 소유지배괴리도가 클수록 지배주주는 조세회피를 통해 얻은 이득을 사적이익을 추구하는데 사용하게 되고 이로 인해 기업가치가 감소할 것으로 예상하였다. 본 연구는 공정거래위원회에서 공시하고 있는 지배주주의 의결권과 소유권 자료를 이용하여 소유지배괴리도를 측정하였으며, 조세회피 측정치는 장기 현금유효세율을 사용하였다. 분석결과, 소유지배괴리도가 큰 집단에서 그렇지 않은 집단보다 조세회피가 기업가치에 부정적인 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. 이는 소유지배괴도가 큰 경우 지배주주가 사적이익을 추구할 유인을 가지고 있고 이와 같은 대리인 문제가 존재하는 경우 조세회피로 인한 이득이 기업가치를 증가시키는 활동에 사용되지 않고 사적으로 유용됨에 따라 기업가치가 감소된 것으로 해석된다. 본 연구는 재벌의 영향력이 강한 우리나라 기업환경을 고려해 지배와 소유의 괴리에서 비롯되는 대리인 문제에 초점을 두고 조세회피가 기업에 미치는 영향을 분석하고자 하였다는데 의의가 있다.

목차

국문 요약
 Ⅰ. 서론
 Ⅱ. 선행연구
 Ⅲ. 연구설계
  3.1 연구가설
  3.2 연구모형
  3.3 변수의 측정
  3.4 연구표본의 선정
 Ⅳ. 실증분석 결과
  4.1 기술통계량 및 상관관계
  4.2 회귀분석결과
  4.3 추가분석
 Ⅴ. 결론
 참고문헌
 Abstract

저자정보

  • 이윤경 Lee, Yun-Kyeong. 한양대학교 회계학 박사

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