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논문검색

Coordination with Price Subsidy When Channels Compete in Real Estate Supply Chain

초록

영어

With the expansion of real estate business, many real estate developers begin to sell some of their houses to some real estate agents and consumers buy those houses through real estate agent in China, which forms market competition with the direct sales channels that real estate developers establish. In order to obtain more profits, some real estate developers provide some real estate agents with price subsidy in the competitive sales channels. Therefore, pricing strategy and price subsidy level become key parameters of the developers’decision. By solving the realestate developer’s profit function, some key indexes in the centralized supply chain and those in the supply chain with the wholesale price contract are obtained. They include the retail price, the sales quantity in each sales channel, the price subsidy level and the total developer’s profit. The revenue-sharing contract is used to coordinate developer-dominant supply chain in decentralized decision. The results shows that the total profit of the real estate supply chain with the price subsidy is larger than that without the price subsidy and the revenue-sharing contract can coordinate the decentralized real estate supply chain. The optimal price subsidy decreases in the market scale that the real estate agent faces and the price subsidy will be canceled by the real estate developer when the market share the agent faces is fifty percent.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Literature Review
 3. Basic Model
 4. Price Subsidy Policy in the Real Estate Supply Chain when Making Centralized Decision
 5. Price Subsidy Policy in the Real Estate Supply Chain when Making Decentralized Decision
  5.1. Supply Chain Decision with the Wholesale Price Contract
  5.2. Supply Chain Decision with the Revenue-Sharing Contract
 6. Numerical Examples
 7. Conclusions
 References

저자정보

  • Xudong Liu School of Business Administration Northeastern University, Shenyang, China

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