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영어

This study analyzed the mechanism and dynamics of the interaction effects of bureaucrat’s policy idea and trade policy institution on trade negotiations among countries. With the analysis of Korea’s FTA deals with Japan, this research found that trade bureaucrat’s policy idea and state’s trade policy institution are the determinants which have affected the trade deal results. Concerning the case analysis of Korea-Japan FTA negotiation, it was failed to conclude because of Korean trade bureaucrats’ strategic denial of the Japan’s final offer of concessional rate of market liberalization. The deal had become to be in stalemate under the discrepancy of trade bureaucrats’ strategic stance on policy ideas and strategic management of institution. The ideas of bureaucrats of both countries were the same as passive liberalism. However the level of strategic management of institutional slack, which has been exploited by trade bureaucrats of both parties, was quite different at each country. The level of bureaucrats’ strategic management of institution and institutional slack was higher in Korea than in Japan. This means that the governmental politics of the Office of the Minister for Trade (OMT) of Korea against with other competing players was relatively more dominant at the domestic political bargaining process rather than that of Japan. Furthermore, the trade bureaucrats and trade organizations strategically exploited the institutional slack for the benefit of individual and organizational interests by way of governmental politics and organizational behaviors against the rival entities at the domestic political bargaining.