earticle

영어

Due to the uncertainty of the green product market, the manufacturers assume enormous R&D and manufacturing risks. Under such background, the problem regarding the cooperation between the manufacture and the retailer becomes an important factor influencing the decisions and the profits of the two parties. In allusion to such problem, the revenue sharing contract is proposed in this article to promote the deep cooperation between the manufacturer and the retailer. Firstly, in consideration of such factors as product greenness and risk avoidance, the centralized decision-marking model and the manufacturer predominated Stackelberg game model are established, wherein the supply chain efficiency of the latter model is discovered to be less than that of the former model. Therefore, the revenue sharing contract is proposed to coordinate the green supply chain so as to make the overall profit and efficiency of the supply chain reach the corresponding level of the centralized decision-making model. Finally, the numerical experiment is carried out to verify the effectiveness and the reliability of the proposed revenue sharing contract. The experiment result shows that the revenue contract can well coordinate the cooperative relationship between the manufacturer and the retailer and meanwhile maximally improve the utilities and the profits for the two parties.