원문정보
피인용수 : 0건 (자료제공 : 네이버학술정보)
초록
영어
Precomputation look-up table based masking countermeasure is low-cost and secure against first-order DPA, therefore is more suitable for lightweight ciphers in resourceconstrained devices. In this paper, we investigate the resistance of this masking countermeasure against second-order power analysis attack under the attack context of the Hamming weight leakage and the precomputation masked S-box. We improve the Adapted CPA technique [1] to make a better use of this attack context. Our attack successfully reveals the secret key with and without electronic noise and algorithmic noise. The number of power traces required to reveal the secret key rises from 600(unprotected implementation) to 16,000.
목차
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Masking Countermeasures
3. Second-Order Power Analysis Attacks
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Single MS-box without Noise
4.2. Single MS-box with White Noise
4.3. Attack against Masked KLEIN
5. Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
1. Introduction
2. Masking Countermeasures
3. Second-Order Power Analysis Attacks
4. Experimental Results
4.1. Single MS-box without Noise
4.2. Single MS-box with White Noise
4.3. Attack against Masked KLEIN
5. Conclusion
Acknowledgments
References
저자정보
참고문헌
자료제공 : 네이버학술정보