원문정보
초록
영어
The widespread use of Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technologies help to trace a large number of commodity and share the tag information in the supply chain system. However, many ownership transfer protocols are subject to various attacks. We analyze the security of two protocols. Even if the designers claim that their protocols are security, we find that their schemes suffer from forward traceability attacks and tracing attacks. In addition, we show that a weak attacker can retrieve the secrets of the tag with a probability 1 in Kardaş et al.’s protocol. To resist against these attacks, we present an improved scheme based on Kardaş et al.’s protocol by adopting the new key-update mechanism. In the end, we show the enhanced versions provides the forward and backward untraceable security properties.
목차
1. Introduction
2. Preliminaries
3. Cryptanalysis of Doss et al.’s Protocol
4. Cryptanalysis of Kardaş et al.’s Protocol
4.1. Tracing Attack on Karda¸s et al.’s Protocol Under the Weak Attacker
4.2. Forward Traceability Attack on Protocol under the Strong Attacker
5. The Improvement of Kapoor et al.’s Protocol
5.1. The Formal Privacy Proof
5.2. Security Analysis
5.3. The Comparisons of Security Properties
6. Conclusions
References