원문정보
초록
영어
Although the theory of two-sided markets is popular nowadays, little attention was paid on self-network externalities and UGC (User Generated Content) produced by buyers which are the major features of social commerce two-sided markets. This article studies percentages of buyers who generated UGC, self-network externalities of buyers and cross-group externalities between two groups. The three factors influence the pricing strategy of social commerce platforms based on two-sided markets. With analyzing the special characteristics of social commerce, the study unveils that the optimal price of buyers charged by social commerce platform shows a negative correlation with self-network externalities and it also shows a negative correlation with the probability of UGC generated by buyers. The study also shows that the equilibrium price of buyers declines with the augment of cross-group externalities of buyers to sellers, and the equilibrium price of sellers declines with the augment of cross-group work externalities of sellers to buyers. The social commerce platforms on the basis of interest graph, lower UGC threshold and more interactive among customers gain the competitive advantages. Compared to other platforms, the two-sided social commerce platforms give consumers and retailers more subsidies.
목차
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review
2.1. Definition of Two-sided Markets
2.2. Two-sided Markets’ Classification
2.3. Characteristics of Two-sided Markets
2.4. Pricing of Two-sided Markets
3. Characteristics of Two-sided Markets in Social Commerce Platform
3.1. Platform and Heterogeneous Groups in Both Sides Existing
3.2. Non-neutral Price Structures
3.3. Needs Interdependence
3.4. Cross-group Externalities
3.5. The Special Properties of Self-network Externalities in Social Commerce Platforms
4. Pricing Strategies of Social Commerce Platforms
4.1. Illustration of Business Mode
4.2 Platforms’ Pricing and Profit Models
4.3. Optimal Price for Buyers in Social Commerce Platform
4.4. Optimal Price for Sellers in Social Commerce Platform
4.5. Mathematical Simulation and Discussion
5. Discussion
6. Conclusion
7. Limitation and Future Work
References
