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Nowadays, technological assets are recognized as principal determinants of firms' competitiveness and thus firms all over the world invest much resources to develop new technology or innovation. As technology in general is getting more advanced and complicated, there may be many owners with Intellectual Property Rights(IPRs) in relation to particular product or service. In this aspects, the patent pooling have a fast growing interest as a good alternative means for decreasing transaction costs between IPRs owners and promoting technology commercialization and diffusion. The patent pool is basically a kind of inter IPR owners' cooperation involving many stakeholder. Therefore, the patent pooling may broadly influence on the technological strategy and/or innovation activities of firms as well as the related industry and market. On the contrary there are much legal discussion about the patent pool, economists and management scholars do not have a much interest in the particular licensing mechanism. However, according to recent economic literatures, a patent pool consisting of complementary technologies is generally recognized as procompetitive by competition authorities and scholars because of their positive effects on final goods price and industry output. Even though some scholars insist that the patent pool consisting of complementary technologies affect negatively on the firms' innovation activities depending upon the number of innovators and essential IPRs, it is theoretically supported that the patent pool can have positive influence on the innovation market as well as final goods market. Although we recognize the positive effects of patent pool, there may be various side effects if we permit unconditionally the patent pool. Therefore, we should prepare a socially optimal mechanism that induces the welfare-increasing patent pools but prevent the welfare-decreasing patent pools. In my opinion, both “Openness” in membership and “Independent licensing” of members is a useful tool of the socially optimal mechanism. In addition, it is necessary that we control effectively behaviors of potential outsider in the pooling activities if we activate successfully the welfare-increasing patent pools. For this purpose, it is reasonable that we consider the intervention of a standard-setting organizations(SSO) or third-party licensing administration institute in the patent pooling activities. In particular, these SSO or third-party licensing administration institute should implement mainly function in relating to pricing of IPRs such as the evaluation of essential technologies, appropriate royalty rate, etc.