원문정보
초록
영어
Under the assumption that ATO (assemble-to-order) supply chain consists of an assembler and two suppliers, who respectively provide one component to the assembler and may form an alliance to negotiate with the assembler, we develop a components replenishment model to study how the ATO supply chain decides components replenishment policies and the suppliers’ alliance policies. The optimal solution of the model is obtained, and the effects of the bargaining power on the optimal solution are theoretically and numerically analyzed. We found that with the enhancement of the bargaining power of the assembler to one supplier, the component selling price and profits of this supplier reduce, and those of another supplier increase. Simultaneously, the expected profit of the assembler increases if its bargaining power is stronger than the other supplier, otherwise, it decreases. If both suppliers’ bargaining powers are stronger than assembler’s, they should bargain with the assembler jointly; if both of their bargaining powers are weaker than the assembler’s, they will bargain with the assembler individually.
목차
1. Introduction
2. The Model
3. The Optimal Solution
3.1. Individual Negotiation
3.2. Joint Negotiation
4. Numerical Analysis
5. Conclusions
Acknowledgments
References
