원문정보
초록
영어
This study examines whether firms’ decisions to offer company stock in defined contribution (DC) plans are explained by managers’ corporate control motives. Using a large sample of proxy voting outcomes, I find that employee ownership in DC plans is significantly and positively associated with the level of voting support for management sponsored proposals. This suggests that managers encourage employee DC holdings in company stock in order to receive higher voting support in favor of management. The effects of employee ownership on voting outcomes are significantly greater in subsample tests than in full sample tests: management proposals opposed by Institutional Shareholder Services, management proposals of close votes, director election votes receiving more than 20% of votes withheld, and say-on-pay frequency proposals.
목차
I. INTRODUCTION
II. BACKGROUND
2.1. Company Stock in Defined Contribution Plans
2.2. What Motivates a Firm to Offer Company Stock in DC Plans?
III. HYPOTHESES AND SAMPLE DESCRIPTIONS
3.1. Hypotheses and Empirical Methodology
3.2. Source of Data and Sample Construction
3.3. Construction of Variables and Summary Statistics
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
4.1. Employee Ownership and Voting Outcomes
4.2. Employee Ownership and Voting Outcome by Proposal Types
4.3. Employee Ownership, Voting Outcomes, and Corporate Governance
4.4. Employee Ownership and Managerial Ownership
4.5. Two Stage Least Squares
V. CONCLUSION
REFERENCES