원문정보
초록
영어
We find that both investment and compensation policies become less efficient following seasoned equity offerings. During the year of SEO and the following year, the shareholder return-to-investment sensitivity decreases, the likelihood of overinvestment increases, and acquisition announcement returns decrease. At the same time, top officers’ and directors’ compensation increases, their pay-for-performance sensitivity decreases, and firm value decreases. These post-SEO changes are significantly related to investor reactions at the time of SEO announcements. Our results are based on publicly-listed Chinese firms over the period 2000 to 2012, which experienced exogenous regulatory shocks on the eligibility to issue SEOs. The shocks allow construction of instruments to address endogeneity issues. Our findings imply that SEO proceeds, on average, are used unproductively for shareholders and provide private benefits to management.
목차
I. INTRODUCTION
II. SEASONED EQUITY OFFERINGS IN CHINA
II.1 General Background
II.2 Regulatory Changes on Chinese SEOs
III. DATA
III.1 Sample Description
III.2.Definition of Key Variables
III.3. Summary Statistics
IV. EFFICIENCY CHANGES FOLLOWING SEOS
IV.1. Investment Efficiency
IV.2. Director and Officer Compensation Following SEOs
IV.3. Firm Performance during SEO years
IV.4. Underwritten Offering vs. Rights Offerings
IV.5. Robustness
V. SEO ANNOUNCEMENT RETURNS AND INVESTMENT AND COMPENSATION EFFICIENCY
V.1. Uni-variate Analyses
V.2. Multivariate Analyses
VI. CONCLUSION
References
Table
Appendices