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논문검색

Market Discipline by Wholesale Financiers Revisited

초록

영어

Using US commercial bank data from 2002 to 2012, this paper investigates whether wholesale financiers discipline banks by withdrawing funds from risky ones and/or charging them higher interest rates. Contrary to previous literature, there is no evidence for market discipline in terms of wholesale funding supply until 2010 when the Dodd-Frank Act was introduced. Risky banks obtain more wholesale funding than safe banks in the pre-crisis period. Furthermore, this result holds during the financial crisis period of 2008. Wholesale financiers demand higher interest rates for riskier banks only during the crisis and the post-crisis periods.

목차

Abstract
 1. Introduction
 2. Hypotheses
 3. Background Information on wholesale funding
 4. Data and methodology
 5. Empirical results
 6. Conclusion
 References
 Figure
 Table

저자정보

  • Sung Wook Joh Seoul National University
  • Jeongsim Kim Seoul National University

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