원문정보
초록
영어
This paper investigates the effects of managerial ownership on shareholder wealth gains in management buyouts to study whether target managers expropriate public shareholder interests when they buy out a firm. We find that the transaction premiums are negatively associated with the buyout managers’ stock holdings, but not with their option holdings. This evidence indicates that acquiring managers, using their corporate power associated with their stock holdings, pursue their own interests at the expense of public shareholders, and that their interest in the post-buyout firm dominates their interest associated with their options. We also find that the transaction premiums are not associated with the nonbuyout managers’ stock and option holdings.
목차
1. Development of Hypotheses
1.1 Managerial Involvement in a Going-Private Process
1.2 Stock and Option Hypotheses
2. The MBO Sample
3. Managerial Stock and Option Holdings
3.1 Identification of buyout and non-buyout manager teams
3.2 Stock and option holdings of a manager team
3.3 Summary of the managerial stock and option holdings
4. Empirical Analysis
4.1 Variables in the analysis
4.2 Results for the buyout manager teams
4.3 Results for the non-buyout manager teams
4.4 Robustness
5. Conclusion
Appendix
References
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