원문정보
초록
영어
Using information on business, professional and social ties of directors, we examine how board independence and lack of independence affect firm value. Independent outsiders improve firm value on average while friendly outsiders have negative impact. Independent boards as monitor perform better in large firms with less-information asymmetry and high transparency. However, friendly boards increase firm value more than independent boards when facing financial volatility and M&A threats. Furthermore, politically connected friendly outsiders have more positive impacts on the domestic companies. Our results suggest that the effectiveness of boards’ multiple roles as monitor, advisor, and facilitator depends on their independence and corporate environments.
목차
1. Introduction
2. Previous Literature on the Role of Outside Directors and Hypotheses
2.1. Role of Outside Directors
2.2 Hypotheses
3. Sample selection and data
3.1. Data Sources
3.2. Regression variables
3.3. Data description
4. Empirical design and results
4.1. Valuation effect of board independence/friendliness
4.2. Board Monitoring and Information Environments
4.3. Advising and Financial Volatility
4.4. Board as Facilitator and Regulatory Environments
5. Conclusion
REFERENCES
Table
Appendix