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초록
영어
We examine how CEO power affects the extent of analyst coverage. Due to agency conflicts, powerful CEOs may not adopt a disclosure policy that maximizes shareholders’ wealth. The amount of information disclosed by the firm influences the information environment, which affects the financial analyst’s incentives to “cover” or “follow” the firm. Consistent with this notion, we show that firms with powerful CEOs are covered by fewer analysts. In addition, the empirical evidence suggests that analyst coverage helps improve firm value. The positive effect of analyst coverage on firm value, however, is greatly mitigated in firms with powerful CEOs. Strong CEO power appears to counteract the beneficial role of analyst coverage.
목차
Abstract
I. Introduction
II. Literature Review
A. Analyst Following
B. CEO Power
C. The Role of CEO Power on Corporate Outcomes
III. Hypothesis Development
A. The Opacity Hypothesis
B. The Transparency Hypothesis
C. The Opacity Substitution Hypothesis
D. The Transparency Substitution Hypothesis
IV. Sample Construction and Data Description
A. Sample Formation
B. Measuring CEO power Using CEO Pay Slice (CPS)
C. CEO Pay Slice vs. Other Indicators
D. Descriptive Statistics
V. Empirical Results
A. Impact of CEO power on Analyst Following
B. Possible Endogeneity: Reverse Causality
C. Possible Endogeneity: Unobservable Characteristics
D. Potential Industry Effects
E. Robustness Check: Alternate measure of CEO Power
F. CEO power and Information Asymmetry
G. Firm Value, Analyst Following, and CEO Power
VI. Concluding Remarks
References
Table
I. Introduction
II. Literature Review
A. Analyst Following
B. CEO Power
C. The Role of CEO Power on Corporate Outcomes
III. Hypothesis Development
A. The Opacity Hypothesis
B. The Transparency Hypothesis
C. The Opacity Substitution Hypothesis
D. The Transparency Substitution Hypothesis
IV. Sample Construction and Data Description
A. Sample Formation
B. Measuring CEO power Using CEO Pay Slice (CPS)
C. CEO Pay Slice vs. Other Indicators
D. Descriptive Statistics
V. Empirical Results
A. Impact of CEO power on Analyst Following
B. Possible Endogeneity: Reverse Causality
C. Possible Endogeneity: Unobservable Characteristics
D. Potential Industry Effects
E. Robustness Check: Alternate measure of CEO Power
F. CEO power and Information Asymmetry
G. Firm Value, Analyst Following, and CEO Power
VI. Concluding Remarks
References
Table
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