원문정보
초록
영어
In this paper we examine the relation between corporate governance and stock market liquidity around the world where different legal institutions are present. We conjecture that better internal corporate governance is more useful and effective in reducing information asymmetry and thereby increasing stock market liquidity in countries with inferior legal and regulatory environments for shareholder right protection. Consistent with this prediction, we find that liquidity tends to be higher for firms with better internal corporate governance in countries with poor legal and regulatory environments for shareholder right protection (e.g., German civil law countries). In contrast, we find that the relation between internal governance and stock liquidity is not statistically significant in countries with relatively strong shareholder protection laws.
목차
1. Introduction
2. Legal Origins, Liquidity, and Corporate Governance
3. Data Description and Variable Definition
3.1 Corporate Governance Score
3.2 Sample Selection and Data Sources
3.3 Definition of Variables
3.4 Other Governance Variables
4. Cross-Country Analysis of Firm Level Corporate Governance and Liquidity
4.1 Sample Characteristics
4.2 The Impact of Corporate Governance on Liquidity around the World
4.3 Legal Environments, Corporate Governance, and Liquidity
4.4 Robustness of Results
5. Conclusion
References
Table
Appendix