earticle

논문검색

Heated Negotiation within the Syndicate and IPOs

초록

영어

This paper examines the determinants of heated negotiation within the syndicate––i) between the lead underwriter and co-managers and ii) among co-managers––and how heated negotiation affects IPOs. We find that heated negotiation is positively related to underwriter compensation for the lead underwriter, the number of co-managers, and gross spread in dollars and negatively to underwriter compensation for co-managers and co-managers’ average reputation, The presence of co-manager all-star analysts is important for heated negotiation between the lead underwriter and co-managers but not a factor for that among co-managers. Heated negotiation appears to increase the number of market makers in the aftermarket and such result is more pronounced when there is heated negotiation among co-managers.

목차

ABSTRACT
 1. Introduction
 2. Data and Sample Characteristics
  2.1. Sample and data
  2.2. Descriptive Statistics
 3. Empirical Questions and Results
  3.1. Do IPOs with heated negotiation provide enhanced underwriter services?
  3.2. Empirical results
 4. Summary and Conclusions
 References
 Appendix

저자정보

  • Jin Q. Jeon Division of Business and Economics Western Oregon University Monmouth, OR 97361
  • Jin S. Kim School of Business Administration Kyungbook National University Daegu, 702-701, South Korea
  • Cheolwoo Lee School of Business Ferris State University

참고문헌

자료제공 : 네이버학술정보

    함께 이용한 논문

      ※ 기관로그인 시 무료 이용이 가능합니다.

      • 5,700원

      0개의 논문이 장바구니에 담겼습니다.