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We investigate the market structure and the pricing by placement agents of private investments in public equities (PIPEs). Our findings indicate that more reputable agents associate with larger offers and with firms possessing lower risks. Agent reputation is positively associated with lower discounts and an enhanced post-PIPE trading environment. We also observe support for the hypothesis that issuers pay a dollar fee premium for these benefits. The evidence suggests that it is the quality of the issuing firm, in conjunction with the pricing and reputational concern of the placement agent, that drive the equilibrium in the PIPE market.
목차
ABSTRACT
I. The PIPE Market and Placement Agents
II. Sample and Summary Statistics
III. The Matching of Issuers and Placement Agents
IV. Do More Reputable Placement Agents Provide Higher-Quality Services?
A. All-in Net Discounts, Offer Proceeds, and the Probability of Being Delisted
B. Post-PIPE Analyst Coverage, Bid-Ask Spread, and Volatility
V. Do More Reputable Placement Agents Charge a Fee Premium?
A. Placement Agent Reputation and Agent Fee
B. Simultaneity Tests
C. Robustness Check: The Lee (1978) Two-Stage Model
VI. Conclusion and Discussion
References
Appendix
I. The PIPE Market and Placement Agents
II. Sample and Summary Statistics
III. The Matching of Issuers and Placement Agents
IV. Do More Reputable Placement Agents Provide Higher-Quality Services?
A. All-in Net Discounts, Offer Proceeds, and the Probability of Being Delisted
B. Post-PIPE Analyst Coverage, Bid-Ask Spread, and Volatility
V. Do More Reputable Placement Agents Charge a Fee Premium?
A. Placement Agent Reputation and Agent Fee
B. Simultaneity Tests
C. Robustness Check: The Lee (1978) Two-Stage Model
VI. Conclusion and Discussion
References
Appendix
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