원문정보
피인용수 : 0건 (자료제공 : 네이버학술정보)
초록
영어
We examine liquidity effects of dual-class stock splits that change firms’ ownership structure from one share one vote to two classes with disparate voting rights. Following dual-class splits, effective spreads, price impacts, and order execution difficulty increase and the investor base decreases significantly for both superior- and inferior-voting shares. In contrast, following a matched sample of regular splits, the investor base increases and order execution improves significantly. Pursuant to the adoption of extreme form of corporate governance and weakened shareholder rights, and consistent with the implied effects of a deteriorating information environment, we find that dual-class splits adversely affect stock liquidity.
목차
Abstract
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses
2.1. Stock Split and Liquidity
2.2. Pros and Cons of Dual-Class Splits
2.3. The Liquidity Effect of Dual-Class Splits
3. Data
3.1. Sample Selection
3.2. Characteristics of the Dual-Class and the Matched Firms
3.3. Investor Base and Dual-Class Splits
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Effective Spreads
4.2. Amihud’s Illiquidity Measure
4.3. Liu’s (2006) LMx
5. Cross-Sectional Analyses
6. Concluding Remarks
References
Table
1. Introduction
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses
2.1. Stock Split and Liquidity
2.2. Pros and Cons of Dual-Class Splits
2.3. The Liquidity Effect of Dual-Class Splits
3. Data
3.1. Sample Selection
3.2. Characteristics of the Dual-Class and the Matched Firms
3.3. Investor Base and Dual-Class Splits
4. Empirical Results
4.1. Effective Spreads
4.2. Amihud’s Illiquidity Measure
4.3. Liu’s (2006) LMx
5. Cross-Sectional Analyses
6. Concluding Remarks
References
Table
저자정보
참고문헌
자료제공 : 네이버학술정보