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This paper examines whether the governance role of foreign block acquirers in U.S. targets is different from that of domestic block acquirers. We find that foreign block acquirers are less likely to engage in post-acquisition governance activities in U.S. targets than domestic control block acquirers matched by several key variables. Among foreign block acquirers, those whose countries share a common language and a common legal origin with the U.S., and those with more acquisition experience in the U.S. are more likely to engage in post-acquisition governance activities; those at a further distance from their targets are less likely to engage in post-acquisition governance activities. We also find that foreign block acquirers are more likely to replace poorly performing target management if they are located geographically closer to their acquirers or if their acquirers have more acquisition experience in the U.S. Finally, U.S. targets in foreign block acquisitions realize higher abnormal announcement returns if they are located closer to the acquirers or if their acquirers have more acquisition experience in the U.S. These results suggest that information asymmetries that foreign acquirers face in the host country are an important determinant of their governance activities in domestic targets, and that the stock market takes into account the extent of such information asymmetries when assessing target value.